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 Using Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico as case studies, this paper examines 
how women’s collaboration influences the effects of gender quotas on women’s 
representation. The efficacy of gender quotas in increasing the numerical representation 
of women and improving gender equality outcomes is well-researched, but questions 
remain about the precise linkages between the numerical representation of women and 
the substantive representation of women. This thesis analyzes previously identified 
linkages alongside actions by women’s organizations in national legislatures and civil 
society to better understand women’s roles as critical actors in making gender quotas 
successful. The findings suggest that women’s collaboration is crucial in achieving and 
defining substantive representation, ensuring proper implementation of quotas, and 
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 Eighty-two countries around the world currently implement mandated gender 
quotas for their legislatures, yet the global average of female representation in national 
legislatures is just 23 percent.1 Evidence suggests that it is often difficult for women to 
reach parity in national legislatures without quotas. Currently, there are only five 
countries in the world in which women comprise half of the total number of seats in the 
legislature: Bolivia, Cuba, Mexico, Rwanda, and the United Arab Emirates.2 Of these 
countries, only Cuba does not use an official gender quota.3 However, even among 
countries with gender quotas only a select few have achieved parity in their legislatures.4 
More troubling still is the lack of conclusive cross-country evidence that gender quotas, 
even when effective in increasing numerical representation, lead to improved outcomes 
for women – such as increased economic and educational opportunities, decreased 
gender-based violence, and stronger civil rights.5 While significant scholarly attention has 
been given to the processes and factors motivating the adoption of gender quotas and the 
 
1 “Gender Quotas Database | International IDEA,” accessed September 15, 2020, https://www.idea.int/data-
tools/data/gender-quotas. 
2 Sara Atske, A.W. Geiger, and Alissa Scheller, “The Share of Women in Legislatures around the World Is 
Growing, but They Are Still Underrepresented,” Pew Research Center, accessed October 9, 2020, 
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/03/18/the-share-of-women-in-legislatures-around-the-world-
is-growing-but-they-are-still-underrepresented/. 
3 “Gender Quotas Database | International IDEA.” 
4 Ibid.  
5 Mona Lena Krook, “Introduction to Gender Quotas,” in Quotas for Women in Politics: Gender and 
Candidate Selection Reform Worldwide (Oxford University Press, 2010), 13.  
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mechanisms influencing the success of quotas in raising the descriptive representation of 
women, questions remain about the extent and causes of the substantive effects of gender 
quotas.6 
 The under-representation of women in national legislatures is not confined to any 
one region, culture, electoral system, or level of income and development,7 yet scholarly 
explanations for the scarcity of female legislators vary from country to country.8 
Similarly, gender equality outcomes vary significantly among countries at similar levels 
of female representation in the legislature, suggesting that high descriptive representation 
of women is not a sufficient cause of high substantive representation. This paper 
examines the descriptive and substantive outcomes of gender quotas in four case studies 
in order to analyze how critical mass theory applies to women’s representation in the 
context of national legislated candidate gender quotas.  
Before delving into this topic, it is necessary to clarify key terms and identify the existing 
consensuses and contradictions in the literature.  
 Representation is referred to in this paper in two distinct ways. Descriptive 
representation is used to refer to the number and proportion of women in legislatures.9 
This is typically the simplest form of representation to assess in terms of outcomes, 
although some scholars of descriptive representation have delved beyond the proportion 
of women to also examine the different kinds of women represented. These works look at 
 
6 Drude Dahlerup, “Gender Quotas – Controversial But Trendy,” International Feminist Journal of Politics 
10, no. 3 (September 1, 2008): 326–28, https://doi.org/10.1080/14616740802185643. 
7 “Gender Quotas Database | International IDEA.” 
8 Pamela Marie Paxton, Melanie M. Hughes, and Tiffany Barnes, Women, Politics, and Power: A Global 
Perspective (Rowman & Littlefield, 2020), 18-25.  
9 Sarah Childs and Mona Lena Krook, “Analysing Women’s Substantive Representation: From Critical 
Mass to Critical Actors,” Government and Opposition 44, no. 2 (2009): 127-8, 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-7053.2009.01279.x. 
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the diversity of representation within groups of female legislators, for example their 
family backgrounds, income levels, and races or ethnicities.10 Substantive representation 
measures the impact of increased numbers of women in qualitative terms. In evaluating 
this form of representation, both legislative processes and outcomes are considered.11 In 
other words, substantive representation is a measure of the position and agency of women 
within legislative bodies and their power and will to represent women’s interests.12 
However, because of the complexity of this topic, scholars have taken varied approaches 
to measuring substantive representation. Commonly used variables include representation 
in committees and sub-committees, surveys on legislator attitudes, bill introduction, 
authorship, and success, and voting records.13 While descriptive representation is the 
most studied in the literature on gender quotas, substantive representation has been 
thoroughly researched and debated, as well.14 These measures of representation are 
interrelated, and scholars have worked to understand the interactions between them, but 
findings on the impact of descriptive representation on substantive representation are 
contradictory.15  
 
10 Mala Htun, Inclusion without Representation in Latin America: Gender Quotas and Ethnic Reservations 
(Cambridge University Press, 2016). 
11 Susan Franceschet, “Gendered Institutions and Women’s Substantive Representation: Female Legislators 
in Argentina and Chile,” in Gender, Politics and Institutions: Towards a Feminist Institutionalism, ed. 
Mona Lena Krook and Fiona Mackay, Gender and Politics Series (London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2011), 60, https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230303911_4. 
12 Childs and Krook, “Analysing Women’s Substantive Representation: From Critical Mass to Critical 
Actors,” 127-28. 
13 Franceschet, “Gendered Institutions and Women’s Substantive Representation: Female Legislators in 
Argentina and Chile,” 60.  
14 Susan Franceschet, Mona Lena Krook, and Jennifer M. Piscopo, “Introduction,” in The Impact of Gender 
Quotas (Oxford University Press, 2012), 7. 
15 Childs and Krook, “Analysing Women’s Substantive Representation: From Critical Mass to Critical 
Actors,” 143-5.  
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 It is also important to clarify what is meant by ‘women’s interests.’ Women are 
not a monolithic body with a consistent set of interests that are distinct from men’s 
interests. Women’s interests as a concept cannot cover the full range of the social, 
economic, and political goals of female constituents or legislators.16 Further, women are 
capable of genuinely desiring and pursuing policies that fall outside of Western feminist 
orthodoxy.17 Borrowing from Piscopo’s work on substantive representation in Mexico, 
this paper uses a ‘value-neutral’ approach in which ‘women’s interests’ refers to all 
policies that deal with the rights and opportunities of women – education, healthcare, 
child care, women’s rights, etc. – regardless of whether the policies are feminist.18 
However, effort is made throughout the paper to distinguish between feminist and non-
feminist policies when relevant.  
 A gender quota is a policy, law, or constitutional amendment that mandates in 
some fashion the gender proportion of people represented in a group.19 Quotas do not 
always explicitly refer to the representation of women; some simply stipulate a minimum 
requirement of some kind for the ‘under-represented sex.’20 In practice, however, these 
quotas almost exclusively deal with the representation of women.21 This paper focuses 
specifically on political gender quotas, meaning quotas that target political bodies. There 
are three broad categories of political gender quotas: party quotas, reserved seat quotas, 
and legislated candidate quotas.  
 
16 Karen Celis et al., “Rethinking Women’s Substantive Representation,” Representation 44, no. 2 (July 1, 
2008): 99-110, https://doi.org/10.1080/00344890802079573. 
17 Celis et al., “Rethinking Women’s Substantive Representation,” 101-105.  
18 Jennifer M. Piscopo, “Beyond Hearth and Home: Female Legislators, Feminist Policy Change, and 
Substantive Representation in Mexico,” Revista Uruguaya de Ciencia Politica 23, no. 2 (2014): 93-94.  
19 Krook, “Introduction to Gender Quotas,” 2.  
20 Ibid.  
21 Ibid.  
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 Party quotas are defined as voluntary gender quotas adopted by political parties 
for the candidates they put forth.22 Party quotas are most popular in Europe and Africa, 
but there is limited evidence of the efficacy of these quotas outside of Western Europe.23 
Though findings are not conclusive, scholars suggest that political parties use voluntary 
gender quotas as a way to appeal to female voters.24 Without enforcement mechanisms 
and placement mandates, some parties relegate female candidates to the least electable 
positions on candidates lists so little progress is actually made in terms of increasing 
female representation, while parties accrue the benefits of appearing progressive.25  
 Reserved seat quotas, most common in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, 
typically work by setting aside a certain number of elected positions for women – only 
female candidates are able to compete for these seats.26 Although these quotas have been 
successful in some countries, there is also substantial evidence that in many places they 
may limit the ability of women to compete for other seats by placing a ceiling, either 
formally or informally, on the spots available to female candidates.27 They are also 
heavily criticized for being non-democratic because they restrict who is able to run for 
certain seats.  
 
22 Franceschet, Krook, and Piscopo, “Introduction,” 15-24.  
23 Leslie A. Schwindt-Bayer, “Making Quotas Work: The Effect of Gender Quota Laws On the Election of 
Women,” Legislative Studies Quarterly 34, no. 1 (2009): 15-17, JSTOR.  
24 Schwindt-Bayer, “Making Quotas Work: The Effect of Gender Quota Laws On the Election of Women,” 
15-17. 
25 Schwindt-Bayer, “Making Quotas Work: The Effect of Gender Quota Laws On the Election of Women,” 
15-17. 
26 Franceschet, Krook, and Piscopo, “Introduction,” 4-6.  
27 Pamela Marie Paxton, Melanie M. Hughes, and Tiffany Barnes, “Explaining the Political Representation 
of Women: Politics,” in Women, Politics, and Power: A Global Perspective (Rowman & Littlefield, 2020), 
187-88.  
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 Legislated candidate quotas function similarly to party quotas in that they regulate 
the proportion of each gender on party candidate lists. The key difference between these 
two categories of quotas is that legislated quotas are not voluntary, rather they are 
mandated through laws or constitutional amendments.28 Although legislated candidate 
quotas are found in most regions of the world, they are particularly concentrated in Latin 
America.29 In fact, nearly every country in Latin America utilizes a legislated gender 
quota.30 This paper examines the effects of increased descriptive representation on the 
substantive representation of women.  
 
Research Question and Methodology   
 
 This paper will examine the question: To what extent and in what ways does 
women’s collaboration influence the relationship between the descriptive and substantive 
representation of women in the context of legislated candidate gender quotas? Answering 
this question requires an evaluation of critical mass theory and its potential applications 
in understanding how descriptive representation influences substantive representation, as 
well as the role of institutionalist theories in explaining discrepancies in critical mass 
theory. My hypothesis is that women’s collaboration is a critical intervening variable in 
the relationship between descriptive and substantive representation. The independent 
variable descriptive representation evaluates critical mass theory, while I introduce 
women’s collaboration as the central intervening variable. Women’s collaboration as a 
 
28 Franceschet, Krook, and Piscopo, “Introduction,” 8-9.  
29 “Gender Quotas Database | International IDEA.” 
30 Ibid.  
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variable is defined as the organization and mobilization of women within and across the 
legislature and civil society in support of women’s interests. It is measured in terms of the 
presence, composition, and efforts of women’s coalitions, caucuses, and activism 
networks in each case study. The dependent variable is substantive representation, which 
is defined in the introduction. The hypothesis and variables are listed below.  
 
 Hypothesis: The collaboration of women between and across the legislature and 
civil society is a critical variable in defining the relationship between descriptive and 
substantive representation. Women’s collaboration leads to higher levels of substantive 
representation.  
 Independent Variables: Descriptive representation 
 Dependent Variable: Substantive representation  
 Intervening Variable: Women’s collaboration  
 
 Four Latin American case studies are used in this paper. Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
and Mexico all introduced national legislated candidate gender quotas between 1991 and 
2015.31 The case studies are concentrated in Latin America to provide some cultural 
similarity, as this paper will not concentrate heavily on cultural factors that may affect 
female representation. While there are certainly cultural differences between the case 
studies, controlling for region provides a number of important similarities and reduces the 
need to analyze factors such as religion and attitudes about gender roles and women. 
Countries with varying degrees of success in gender quota implementation and varying 
 
31 “Gender Quotas Database | International IDEA.” 
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representation and gender equality outcomes were selected intentionally to allow for 
examination of the linkages between descriptive and substantive representation. Much of 
the existing scholarship on gender quotas highlights the role of democratization in the 
adoption, implementation, and efficacy of gender quotas; however, this will not be a main 
focus of this paper, so it was important to select countries with similar histories of 
authoritarianism. All of the case studies have experienced authoritarianism in the last 20 
to 40 years and are now classified as democracies, although degrees of democratization 
are varied.32 In choosing these case studies, effort was made to control for some features 
of the electoral system, as well. Three of the four case studies are federal republics, Chile 
is the exception.33 All of the countries use proportional representation systems in some 
form, which the literature has identified as an important determinant of gender quota 
success. Throughout the paper, care will be taken to identify important differences in the 
structural, institutional, and cultural factors in each country when relevant to the analysis.  
 Since the introduction of gender quotas in these countries, gains in descriptive and 
substantive representation have been highly varied.34 In 1991, the year Argentina passed 
its first gender quota law, women represented just 5 percent of the Chamber of Deputies 
(lower house) and 9 percent in the Senate (upper house).35 By 2019, women comprised 
 
32 Freedom House, “Countries and Territories,” accessed October 11, 2020, 
https://freedomhouse.org/countries/freedom-world/scores. 
33 Leslie A. Schwindt-Bayer and Santiago Alles, “Women in Legislatures: Gender, Institutions, and 
Democracy,” in Gender and Representation in Latin America, ed. Leslie A. Schwindt-Bayer (Oxford 
University Press, 2018), 57.  
34 Mala Htun, “Gender Quotas: Why and How,” in Inclusion without Representation in Latin America: 
Gender Quotas and Ethnic Reservations (Cambridge University Press, 2016), 44-69.  
35 Tiffany D. Barnes and Mark P. Jones, “Women’s Representation in the Argentine National and 
Subnational Governments,” in Gender and Representation in Latin America, ed. Leslie A. Schwindt-Bayer 
(Oxford University Press, 2018), 123-24.  
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40 and 41 percent of the Argentine Senate and Chamber of Deputies, respectively.36 
Similar increases in descriptive representation have occurred in Mexico, where gender 
parity was achieved for both the Senate and Chamber in 2018.37 In Brazil and Chile, 
however, descriptive representation has remained low. Women constitute 23 percent of 
both the Senate and Chamber in Chile38 and roughly 14 percent of each in Brazil.39 If the 
dominant theories about the effects of gender quotas and increased female representation, 
which are elaborated on later in this chapter, are to be believed then we would expect to 
see that the countries with the highest female representation and most successful quotas 
are more equal than those with lower female representation.40 Later chapters examine the 
level of substantive representation in each country.   
   
Literature Review  
   
 While the locus of this paper will be examining substantive representation as an 
outcome of legislated candidate quotas, it is necessary to discuss why and how gender 
quotas are adopted. Aside from the intrinsic benefit to a democratic or semi-democratic 
system of more equal representation for a group that comprises half of the population,41 
proponents of gender quotas have collectively developed an robust framework 
concerning the need for quotas and the reasons they are adopted. The primary theoretical 
 
36 “Argentina,” Gender Quotas Database, International IDEA. 
37 “Percentage of Women in National Parliaments.” Inter-Parliamentary Union (January 2019). 
38 “Chile,” Gender Quotas Database, International IDEA. 
39 “Brazil,” Gender Quotas Database, International IDEA. 
40 Mona Lena Krook, “Candidate Gender Quotas: A Framework for Analysis,” European Journal of 
Political Research 46, no. 3 (2007): 371-72, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2007.00704.x. 
41 Miki Caul Kittilson and Leslie A. Schwindt-Bayer, The Gendered Effects of Electoral Institutions: 
Political Engagement and Participation (Oxford University Press, 2012), 10-15.   
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underpinning of this framework is that in most countries, without quotas it is exceedingly 
difficult for female legislators to be elected to enough seats to effectively represent 
women’s interests.42 
  Critical mass theory, as this argument is termed, observes that the mere presence 
of women in a male-dominated sphere is not enough to ensure a change in the dynamics 
or functions of that sphere. Studies have found that the proportion of women to men is 
actually the predictor of such shifts. When the ratio of women to men is heavily skewed, 
female members of the group are tokenized and their personal agency reduced.43 Kanter 
categorized the three main results of these skewed sex ratios on the agency and choices of 
women as performance pressures, isolation, and role entrapment.44 While performance 
pressures typically affect the visibility of women, isolation may force women to choose 
between remaining ‘others’ or becoming part of in-group by adopting the role of 
“woman-prejudiced-against-women.”45 Role entrapment limits the ability of women to 
move beyond traditional stereotypes, for example the “mother, the seductress, the pet or 
the iron maiden.”46 She argues that these dynamics are self-perpetuating; as women are 
tokenized it becomes more difficult to organically increase the proportion of women.47 
Building on Kanter’s work, scholars identified the ‘critical mass’ needed for women to 
 
42 Atske, Geiger, and Scheller, “The Share of Women in Legislatures around the World Is Growing, but 
They Are Still Underrepresented.”  
43 Rosabeth Moss Kanter, “Some Effects of Proportions on Group Life: Skewed Sex Ratios and Responses 
to Token Women,” American Journal of Sociology 82, no. 5 (1977): 966, JSTOR. Drude Dahlerup, “From 
a Small to a Large Minority: Women in Scandinavian Politics,” Scandinavian Political Studies 11, no. 4 
(1988): 280, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9477.1988.tb00372.x. 
44 Kanter, “Some Effects of Proportions on Group Life: Skewed Sex Ratios and Responses to Token 
Women,” 966.  
45 Sarah Childs and Mona Lena Krook, “Critical Mass Theory and Women’s Political Representation,” 
Political Studies 56, no. 3 (October 1, 2008): 727, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2007.00712.x. 
46 Childs and Krook, “Critical Mass Theory and Women’s Political Representation,” 727. 
47 Kanter, “Some Effects of Proportions on Group Life: Skewed Sex Ratios and Responses to Token 
Women,” 988.  
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effectively form a ‘counterculture,’ forge alliances, and achieve agency – in other words, 
substantive representation – as 30 percent.48  
 Scholars have also advanced a number of theories to supplement and support the 
critical mass argument. Prominent among these theories is the ‘role model effect,’ 
whereby reaching a critical mass within the legislature engenders cultural shifts that 
empower women to pursue office in other branches of government, enable party 
members to achieve leadership positions, and encourage women to build political 
recruitment networks that increase the descriptive representation of women across 
institutions and beyond minimum quotas.49 However, findings on the role model effect 
are mixed, especially in studies of Latin America.50 A common explanation for cases 
which offer no support for the role model effect is clientelism in party recruitment 
networks, which disadvantages women and prevents them from achieving positions 
beyond the gender quota.51 While some scholars assert that informal recruitment and 
candidate nomination processes benefit female candidates,52 the clientelist networks that 
usually exist in such environments marginalize women once they take office and restrict 
their ability to act beyond the orders of party leaders.53  
 
48 Dahlerup, “From a Small to a Large Minority: Women in Scandinavian Politics,” 280.  
49 Yann Kerevel, “Empowering Women? Gender Quotas and Women’s Political Careers,” The Journal of 
Politics 81, no. 4 (July 18, 2019): 1168, https://doi.org/10.1086/704434. 
50 Ibid.  
51 Rainbow Murray and Réjane Sénac, “Explaining Gender Gaps in Legislative Committees,” Journal of 
Women, Politics & Policy 39, no. 3 (July 3, 2018): 310–35, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/1554477X.2018.1477397. 
52 Jennifer M. Piscopo, “When Informality Advantages Women: Quota Networks, Electoral Rules and 
Candidate Selection in Mexico,” Government and Opposition 51, no. 3 (July 2016): 506-07, 
https://doi.org/10.1017/gov.2016.11. 
53 Piscopo, “Beyond Hearth and Home: Female Legislators, Feminist Policy Change, and Substantive 
Representation in Mexico,” 96-7. 
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 This perspective is one of the most popular from a broader category of 
scholarship on gender quotas that uses institutionalist theories to address the limitations 
of critical mass theory.54 Institutionalist analyses of gender quotas address how formal 
and informal norms in political bodies and parties affect descriptive and substantive 
representation. Frequently, these theories are used to explain cases in which increased 
descriptive representation does not lead to higher substantive representation.55 Political 
clientelism among parties is a prominent example of such theories. Although 
institutionalist theories are sometimes used to refute critical mass, they are more often 
used to explain how distortions can occur without challenging the overall logic of critical 
mass theory.56 Other institutionalist theories examine how aspects of the electoral system 
interact with gender quotas to benefit or disadvantage female candidates. Research on 
district magnitude, proportional representation, and candidate lists falls into this category 
of scholarship.  
 While critical mass theory is widely used, there are a number of gender and 
politics scholars that have presented contradictory findings, and some have denounced 
the theory entirely.57 Studies of gender quotas in particular have focused on when and 
why critical mass fails to produce substantive representation; however, these explanations 
typically focus on single or small numbers of case studies and existing literature has 
failed to identify a consistent cross-national theory.58 Further, even when examining the 
 
54 Fiona Mackay, Meryl Kenny, and Louise Chappell, “New Institutionalism Through a Gender Lens: 
Towards a Feminist Institutionalism?,” International Political Science Review 31, no. 5 (November 1, 
2010): 573-588, https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512110388788. 
55 Ibid.  
56 Ibid.  
57 Childs and Krook, “Critical Mass Theory and Women’s Political Representation,” 727. 
58 Franceschet, Krook, and Piscopo, “Introduction,” 7. 
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same case studies, scholars emphasize different contributing factors. Some literature 
focuses on the motivations of gender quota proponents and how quotas come to be 
adopted as explanations for disparities in descriptive and substantive representation.  
 Critical analyses argue that gender quotas are passed through predominately male 
legislatures because male politicians either design the quotas to be ineffective or use the 
quota system to install female legislators with little political agency59 or who will 
promote their party’s agenda.60 Of course, there are numerous other critiques of gender 
quotas, primarily relating to principles of fairness, specific conceptions of democratic 
election, and the availability of qualified potential female legislators, but these issues will 
be addressed later in the paper.61 
As a result of critical scrutiny on the reasoning behind male legislators passing quotas 
laws, scholars have dedicated extensive research to the groups and motivations that 
engender quota laws.62  
 Four narratives emerge from the literature on this topic. First, women mobilize in 
support of increased representation, using existing women’s organization or forming new 
ones to advocate for the introduction of gender quotas.63 This occurs internally in 
political institutions and externally as public movements.64 Scholars argue that pressure 
 
59 Mackay, Kenny, and Chappell, “New Institutionalism Through a Gender Lens: Towards a Feminist 
Institutionalism?,” 583.  
60 Krook, “Introduction to Gender Quotas,” 9-11.  
61 Tricia Gray, “Electoral Gender Quotas: Lessons from Argentina and Chile,” Bulletin of Latin American 
Research 22, no. 1 (2003): 52-78, JSTOR.   
62 Dahlerup, “Gender Quotas – Controversial But Trendy,” 327.  
63 Kathleen Bruhn, “Whores and Lesbians: Political Activism, Party Strategies, and Gender Quotas in 
Mexico,” Electoral Studies 22, no. 1 (March 1, 2003): 101–19, https://doi.org/10.1016/S0261-
3794(01)00039-7. 
64 Bruhn, “Whores and Lesbians: Political Activism, Party Strategies, and Gender Quotas in Mexico,” 107-
11. 
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from female party members and public mobilization is often, although not always, an 
important factor in passing quota laws and in ensuring that parties enforce these laws 
when enforcement mechanisms are weak.65 In contradiction to critiques that emphasize 
the self-serving role of male-dominated parties and male legislators, this narrative 
identifies women as key actors in quota law adoption.66  
 Second, political parties adopt internal quotas or advocate for legislated candidate 
quotas for competitive reasons.67 When a rival political party adopts a gender quota, 
others may follow in a contagion effect as they fear losing out to their opposition.68 
Similarly, parties may choose a quota during periods of declining support or in the face of 
increasing opposition.69 Most works promoting this explanation argue that male party 
leaders and legislators adopt gender quotas to attract female constituents and gain a 
competitive edge over predominately male competitors.70 This narrative, in which the 
role of women is diminished, is frequently used to explain cases where quotas fail to 
reach the target level of descriptive representation.71  
 Third, governments and political parties may introduce quota laws because they 
are consistent with existing dominant views on equality and representation.72 Examples 
 
65 Ibid.  
66 Karen Celis, Mona Lena Krook, and Petra Meier, “The Rise of Gender Quota Laws: Expanding the 
Spectrum of Determinants for Electoral Reform,” West European Politics 34, no. 3 (May 1, 2011): 521, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2011.555981. 
67 Miki Caul, “Political Parties and the Adoption of Candidate Gender Quotas: A Cross–National 
Analysis,” Journal of Politics 63, no. 4 (2001): 1216, https://doi.org/10.1111/0022-3816.00107. 
68 Ibid.  
69 Ibid.  
70 Caul, “Political Parties and the Adoption of Candidate Gender Quotas: A Cross–National Analysis,” 
1216.  
71 Lisa Baldez, “Elected Bodies: The Gender Quota Law for Legislative Candidates in Mexico,” Legislative 
Studies Quarterly 29, no. 2 (2004): 235. JSTOR.  
72 Katharina Inhetveen, “Can Gender Equality Be Institutionalized?: The Role of Launching Values in 
Institutional Innovation,” International Sociology 14, no. 4 (December 1, 1999): 420-22, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0268580999014004002. 
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of this are countries in which gender quotas have been adopted after or in conjunction 
with quotas for other marginalized groups, such as in Iraq and Jordan where quotas exist 
for both women and religious minorities.73 Political parties may also support gender 
quotas because they align with party ideology.74 Scholarly works advocating this theory 
suggest that not only are Leftist parties more likely to introduce quota laws, but that 
quotas are more effective when implemented under a Left-dominated government.75 
However, supporting evidence for this theory is case-specific and has not been confirmed 
by cross-national trends.76  
 Fourth, international factors motivate governments and political parties to 
implement gender quotas. This may be due to norm dispersal; many scholars indicate that 
the 1995 United Nations World Conference on Women helped shape international 
perceptions of the importance of female representation in government.77 Others point to 
regional trends where gender quotas may have spread through a contagion effect across 
national borders.78 Latin America in particular is often used as an example of this. 79 In 
another vein of this literature, scholars suggest that gender quotas are introduced to gain 
 
73 Assaf David and Stefanie Nanes, “The Women’s Quota in Jordan’s Municipal Councils: International 
and Domestic Dimensions,” Journal of Women, Politics & Policy 32, no. 4 (October 1, 2011): 278-85, 
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legitimacy in the international arena, to appeal to organizations such as the United 
Nations and the World Bank, or to deflect criticism about human rights abuses.80  
 These four narratives on why and how gender quotas are passed demonstrate the 
diversity of the existing literature. Most case studies acknowledge that all four factors are 
usually present to some extent, but typically identify one dominate narrative. While 
causal links are difficult to identify, this brief analysis of the actors and motivations 
involved in adopting gender quotas provides important context that is useful in 
understanding country-specific variations in the success of gender quotas in increasing 
the descriptive, substantive, and symbolic representation of women.81  
 While consensus on many aspects of gender quotas has been difficult to reach for 
academics, there are some qualities of descriptive representation on which the majority of 
the literature is in agreement. These areas of agreement have been formulated in large 
part as a response to critics of gender quotas who argue that quotas artificially increase 
the representation of women by bringing to power female legislators who are unqualified 
for office. This argument stems from a belief that the recruitment pool of women with the 
appropriate education and experience for legislative office is simply too small, and that 
efforts to increase the representation of women should focus on education, training, and 
mentorship. While such measures are certainly important, gender quota scholarship has 
largely debunked the assertion that women are underrepresented because they are under 
qualified.  
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 In her seminal book on women’s political representation in Latin America, 
Hinjosa puts forth an argument that integrates three strains of factors used by scholars to 
explain cross-national variations in the efficacy of gender quotas.82 This framework falls 
under the category of institutionalist theories used in this paper. The three strains Hinjosa 
uses are referred to as ‘supply side,’ ‘demand side,’ and institutional factors.83 Supply 
side explanations argue that the pool of eligible female candidates is too restricted and 
that female representation is limited by the supply of women candidates even when 
gender quotas are in use.84 These explanations use variables such as maternal health, 
educational attainment, labor force participation, and civic participation as support.85 
Demand side analyses examine the preferences and biases of voters and citizens, 
including cultural beliefs about gender equality and the leadership capacity of women, as 
the primary barrier to increased female representation.86 Institutional explanations look at 
the regulations and procedures of the institutions involved in the election process, such as 
electoral rules and arrangements and candidate selection procedures of political parties.87  
 Hinjosa integrates these three strains of explanations by breaking down the path to 
office into five distinct phases: Population, Eligible, Aspirant, Candidate, Officeholder.88 
Building on previous work in this field, she uses data on variables such as educational 
attainment, work force participation, fertility, wages, and political participation to show 
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that there are indeed enough qualified women in most Latin American countries to fulfill 
candidate quotas.89 She further demonstrates that while citizen and voter bias against 
female political candidates do exist, it is limited and cannot fully explain the 
underrepresentation of women in much of Latin America.90 These conclusions are 
supported by other leading scholars in the literature.91  
 Thus, she argues that the primary challenges for women in transitioning from 
Population to Officeholder are not explained by supply side variables in the shift from 
Population to Eligible, nor by demand side factors in the move from Candidate to Office 
Holder.92 Instead, a potent combination of all three explanatory strains restricts women’s 
advancement from Eligible to Aspirant and Candidate.93 While this terminology is unique 
to Hinjosa’s work and those citing her, it accurately captures the general conclusions 
from the literature. Despite many contradictions and points of contention on the 
importance of specific mechanisms hindering descriptive representation, scholars of 
gender quotas generally agree that other than quota law design and implementation, the 
most salient and intractable barriers are institutional and manifest during political 
recruitment and candidate selection processes.94  
 In focusing her analysis on the transition from Eligible to Aspirant and Candidate, 
Hinjosa develops a sequenced framework that includes elements of each explanatory 
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strain. Per this framework, women face self-selective supply side issues in reaching the 
level of aspirant.95 Hinjosa finds that female Eligibles are less likely than their male 
counterparts with similar qualifications and levels of political interest to believe that they 
are qualified and less likely to self-nominate.96 According to Hinjosa, and numerous 
studies conducted in the United States that she cites, being asked or encouraged to run for 
office is critical in this transition to Aspirant for men and women, but that women are 
both less likely to receive this encouragement and less likely to self-nominate without 
it.97 Once becoming Aspirants, women face institutional challenges generated by the 
candidate selection processes of political parties.98 Scholars of Latin American gender 
quotas disagree on some of the finer points of how these selection processes impact 
women – the benefits of formal versus informal systems, for example, are hotly debated – 
but most agree that the prevalence of clientelism within political parties puts female 
Aspirants at a significant disadvantage.99 Finally, as candidates women may face demand 
side issues. When quota laws are poorly designed, party leaders may relegate female 
candidates to less electable positions on the bottom of candidate lists because they 
believe them to be less appealing to voters or, again, as a function of political 
clientelism.100 Hinjosa’s framework, crucial in highlighting that female 
underrepresentation and the varied successes of quota laws cannot be fully explained by 
either voter preferences or the qualifications of women, will be used throughout the paper 
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to evaluate institutionalist perspectives on how gender quotas have affected the different 




 To what extent and in what ways does women’s collaboration influence the 
relationship between the descriptive and substantive representation of women in the 
context of legislated candidate gender quotas? The findings of this paper support the 
hypothesis that the collaboration of women between and across the legislature and civil 
society is a critical and overlooked variable in defining the relationship between 
descriptive and substantive representation. Critical mass and institutional theories do, to a 
large extent, explain the relationship between gender quotas, descriptive representation, 
and substantive representation. However, the majority of these theories use descriptive 
representation as a ‘middle man’ between gender quotas and substantive representation. 
In doing so, they miss key mechanisms affecting substantive representation in the case 
studies.  
 The correlation between the descriptive and substantive representation of women 
is significant, and is, at least partially, justified through critical mass theory. Institutional 
explanations go far in addressing how formal and informal norms in bodies such as 
political parties create varying results in the leap from critical mass to substantive 
representation. Electoral perspectives have reached thorough consensus on the effect of 
gender quota design and implementation on descriptive representation. In these ways, 
many of the pieces of the puzzle of gender quotas have already been assembled, but key 
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gaps remain in connecting the three images – gender quotas, descriptive representation, 
and substantive representation – to form one cohesive picture. Specifically, mainstream 
research on critical mass theory and institutional explanations both fail to adequately 
address the linkage between gender quotas and substantive representation in a way that is 
distinct from the linkage between descriptive and substantive representation.  
 The main point of critical mass theory, that once women reach approximately 30 
percent of an organization they will be able to overcome bias, tokenization, role 
entrapment and other issues to substantively represent women is over-simplified.101 
Institutional explanations of gender and representation have worked to fill some the gaps 
in this theory by highlighting the mitigating role of predominately formal institutions, 
such as political parties and specific features of the electoral system, in the relationship 
between descriptive and substantive representation.102 The primary finding of this paper 
is that women’s collaboration plays a critical role not only in the adoption and 
implementation of gender quotas, but also in the formation of effective tools and 
organizations for female legislators to enact substantive representation. Evaluation of 
both descriptive and substantive representation in the case studies found that 
collaboration between female legislators and women’s non-governmental organizations 
allowed for more effective articulation of demands both before and after quotas and 
influenced the dynamics of women within the legislature. The research found that 
activism networks combining women in civil society with women in the legislature that 
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were founded during the gender quota movement and persisted afterwards were 
associated with higher substantive representation. Thus, women’s collaboration emerged 
as a significant independent variable. Indeed, when women’s collaboration was added to 
the analysis, the discrepancies between actual levels of substantive representation and 
expected substantive representation, based on descriptive representation and according to 
critical mass theory, were better explained. These discrepancies are visualized in Graph 
1.  
 




 Graph 1 displays the relationship between descriptive and substantive 
representation in each of the case studies as posited in this paper. On the x-axis, 
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descriptive representation is shown as the percentage of women in the legislature.103 On 
the y-axis are original estimates of substantive representation shown as quantitative 
approximates on a scale from 0 to 1. Substantive representation is measured for each case 
study in Chapters Four and Five using the methods outlined in the introduction. The blue 
line is a rough illustration of the relationship predicted between descriptive and 
substantive representation by critical mass theory. This theory is wholly qualitative, so 
the line shown in Graph 1 is an original attempt at translating the principles of critical 
mass theory into a visual. The data points show the real descriptive representation and 
estimated substantive representation of each case study. The graph shows the 
discrepancies between substantive representation in each case study and the substantive 
representation suggested by critical mass theory.  
 Argentina and Mexico were found to have lower substantive representation than 
critical mass theory would suggest and Brazil and Chile were found to have higher 
substantive representation than predicted. These conclusions are reached and explained in 
Chapters Four and Five. The independent variable women’s collaboration helps explain 
these discrepancies. In Mexico and Argentina, women’s collaboration was a key driver of 
substantive representation despite barriers presented by institutional features of the 
political system.104 Mexico saw less feminist substantive representation and more 
women’s interest representation due to the consensus norms within women’s 
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organizations.105 In Argentina, the reverse was true.106 In Brazil107 and Chile,108 women 
within the legislature were not the primary sources of substantive representation; 
however networks between some female legislators and non-governmental organizations 
helped maintain a level of substantive representation that was overall higher than 
expected by critical mass theory.  
 The nature of women’s coalitions and networks clearly influenced the dynamics 
of women’s collaboration in the legislature. Consensus among female legislators emerged 
as a priority in countries where gender quota coalitions were cross-party among 
legislators and cross-section among civil society members. In countries where consensus 
is not a main priority, gender quota adoption was either not precipitated by widespread 
activism, or the supporting coalitions were not cross-party and cross-sectional. The effect 
of consensus versus non-consensus style collaboration of female legislators is non-
monotonic on the overall level of substantive representation. However, the outcomes of 
substantive representation vary according to the prioritization of consensus. In 
legislatures where the expectation among female legislators is that they should all agree 
on a women’s interest bill before proposing it, women’s interests can be well represented 
but feminist interests typically cannot. The opposite effect is observed in legislatures in 
which consensus is not prioritized. In these legislatures, women are more successful in 
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representing feminist interests and less successful in broader forms of women’s interests, 
such as gender mainstreaming. These results are summarized in Graphs 2 and 3 below.  
 





 Graph 2 shows the relationship between women’s collaboration on the x axis and 
substantive representation on the y axis. Both variables are qualitative, but have been 
assigned numerical values on scales from 0 to 1 for the purpose of visualizing their 
relationship. Values closer to 1 indicate higher levels of each variable. This graph 
demonstrates that Mexico and Argentina have similar levels of substantive representation 
and are rated highly on the degree of women’s collaboration, despite the difference in 
their levels of descriptive representation. Women in Brazil and Chile display similar 
levels of collaboration that correspond with their substantive representation.  
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 Graph 3 shows the relationship between women’s collaboration and the primacy 
of consensus norms among women’s organizations. Collaboration and consensus norms 
are both qualitative variables that are shown in the graph on a scale from 0 to 1. On the y 
axis, values closer to 1 indicate that consensus norms are highly observed in the relevant 
women’s organization, while scores closer to 0 indicate the opposite. The degree and type 
of substantive representation in each case study is indicated by the size and color of the 
country’s point on the graph to show how these variables interact. Larger points show 
higher substantive representation. Bright colors show that substantive representation 
includes feminist interests, while grey-scale colors indicate that substantive 
representation is mainly for broader women’s interests. The graph reiterates that higher 
substantive representation is associated with higher women’s collaboration. However, 
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this graph also demonstrates the non-monotonic effect of consensus versus non-
consensus norms within arenas of women’s collaboration on substantive representation. 
The primacy of consensus norms does not affect the overall level of substantive 
representation, but it does affect whether the representation generally includes feminist 
interests.  
 This explanation bridges some of the gap in understanding the relationships 
between gender quotas, descriptive representation, and substantive representation. 
Current research tends to focus on either the link between quotas and descriptive 
representation or between descriptive and substantive representation. Yet, by refocusing 
the analysis on the role of informal coalitions and non-governmental institutions in 
establishing the dynamics and norms of women’s collaboration within the legislature, it is 
possible to see how the events surrounding the adoption of gender quotas ultimately 
influence substantive representation, sometimes even decades later. Understanding and 
investigating this link allows for better explanation of the varying levels and forms of 
substantive representation at each degree of descriptive representation. In other words, 
the connection directly between gender quota formation and substantive representation 
helps to explain why some countries with low descriptive representation experience high 
substantive representation and why substantive representation leads to feminist outcomes 
in some countries and not in others. This does not refute critical mass or institutionalist 
theories, but rather adds a layer of analysis that may prove useful in further development 
of gender quota research.  
 This paper evaluates the research question in four subsequent chapters. Rather 
than dedicating a chapter to each case study, chapters are divided according to descriptive 
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and substantive representation with the high and low performing countries in each form 
of representation grouped in separate chapters. This first chapter has introduced the 
research question, case studies, and main findings while providing an overview of the 
relevant literature. The second and third chapters will examine descriptive representation 
in the case studies with a focus on the mechanisms promoting or hindering effective 
gender quota implementation and how these might affect substantive representation. The 
fourth and fifth chapters will analyze women’s substantive representation. Each of these 
two chapters will investigate whether female legislators prioritize women’s interests and 
their capacity to do so effectively. Following chapter five, the conclusion will revisit the 
central arguments from these chapters and discuss the role of this paper in the broader 















 Reaching Critical Mass in Mexico and Argentina 
 
 This chapter examines descriptive representation in Argentina and Mexico. 
Beginning with an analysis of the quota laws and their implementation, this chapter 
explores the institutional factors and actors contributing to and preventing increased 
representation of women. By comparing case studies in which quota laws have been 
effective descriptively, this chapter will identify important cross-national and contextual 
variables in order to analyze their role in substantive representation in later chapters. 
Chapter Three will use the same approach to study descriptive representation in the two 
less successful cases: Brazil and Chile. Dividing those case studies that have been more 
effective in increasing descriptive representation from those that have had less success 
will allow for a thorough investigation of the links between descriptive and substantive 
representation, as well as identification of potential links between gender quotas and 




 Between 1990 and 2018, the percentage of women in the Mexican legislature 
increased from 12 percent to 49 percent.109 The achievement of gender parity in Mexico 
is due in large part to the use of legislated candidate quotas, but the path from the first 
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gender quota of 1996 to parity in 2018 is long, convoluted, and as riddled with failures as 
it is with successes. Understanding the challenges that advocates faced in passing 
effective gender quotas sheds light on the institutional features and actors that influence 
women’s descriptive and substantive representation, not just in Mexico but throughout 
Latin America.  
 First, some context on the political landscape and electoral features of Mexico is 
necessary. Mexico is a federal republic comprised of 31 states and Mexico City, which is 
no longer a Federal District but does elect its own federal representatives.110 Much like 
the United States, the government has three independent branches: the executive 
(President and appointed cabinet), the bicameral legislature (the Chamber of Deputies 
and the Senate), and the judiciary (the Supreme Court of Justice).111 Until 2014, no 
elected federal officials could be reelected.112 A 2014 Constitutional amendment allowed 
federal legislators to run for immediate reelection, but the Presidential term limit is one 
six year term.113 The lower house, the Chamber of Deputies, has three year terms. It uses 
a mixed electoral system of 300 Single Member District seats (SMD) and 200 
Proportional Representation (PR) seats.114 Senators, of which there are 128, have six year 
terms.115 Senate seats are assigned to parties through proportional representation; 32 seats 
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are based on the national vote and 96 are based on individual state votes.116 SMD 
legislators are elected by plurality vote from districts in 31 states and Mexico City, while 
PR seats are allocated to political parties according to their percentage of the national 
vote117. Mexico has a high district magnitude for its PR seats. There are five districts for 
the Chamber of Deputies PR seats, each consisting of 40 seats. PR legislators are elected 
from closed and rank-ordered candidate lists, meaning that voters have no influence over 
which candidates are elected from the list when they vote for a given party.118  
 These features of the electoral system are important, as scholarship on the 
political representation of women has found consistent links between PR systems and 
higher proportions of female legislators and effectiveness of gender quotas.119 This is 
because PR systems shift the incentives for parties in candidate selection.120 The ‘winner 
takes all’ procedure of SMD systems in which only one candidate is elected from each 
electoral district incentivizes parties to advance the candidates they believe are the most 
competitive and will have the broadest appeal to voters.121 In many cases, the dominant 
view is that male candidates are more likely to succeed, so party leaders field more male 
candidates in SMD systems. In PR systems, where seats are allocated according to the 
party’s national performance, party leaders are incentivized to put forward a variety of 
candidates with appeal to different social groups because multiple candidates can be 
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elected from each electoral district.122 Thus, women are at a disadvantage in SMD 
systems because of real or perceived voter biases, but are sometimes desired candidates 
in PR systems when party leaders believe that female candidates are more popular with 
female or left-leaning voters.123 District magnitude is also associated with the 
representation of women.124 Female candidates typically fare better in systems with high 
district magnitude, although this effect is more pronounced in PR systems than in 
majoritarian systems.125  
 Although the use of SMD for the majoritarian seats in Mexico should create 
challenges for female candidates, the high district magnitude for Mexico’s PR seats (40 
members) should provide opportunities for potential female legislators. It is, however, 
important to note that the use of closed PR systems gives party leaders an incredible 
amount of influence over which candidates are elected and which are not.126 Even when 
candidate nomination and selection processes are transparent and unbiased, party leaders 
are often able to decide the ranking of candidates on PR lists.127 Rank-ordered, closed PR 
lists allow a number of the top-ranked candidates to be elected. This number of 
candidates is based on the number or proportion of votes the party receives, but 
regardless the top positions on the PR lists are the most likely candidates to be elected.128 
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For this reason, it is important to understand the ideologies, dynamics, and candidate 
selection processes of the main political parties in each case study.  
 Mexico had three main political parties until the success of President Lopez 
Obrador and his center-left party National Regeneration Movement (MORENA) in 2018 
added a fourth party to this list.129 These three parties are the Institutional Party of the 
Revolution (PRI), the National Action Party (PAN), and the Party of the Democratic 
Revolution (PRD).130 Mexico was led by an authoritarian, one-party regime under PRI 
from the Mexican Revolution until the turn of the century.131 Democratization began in 
the late 1980s and was consolidated with the election of President Vicente Fox of PAN in 
2000.132 The PRI is typically characterized as a pro-business center-right party, while 
PAN is a conservative party and the PRD is leftist. In all three parties, the selection of 
political candidates is tightly controlled by party leaders.133 Although the PAN and the 
PRD use primaries for nominations, party leaders are able to heavily influence the 
outcomes of primaries through political clientelism and strategic selection of party 
members to attend the national conventions where primaries are held.134 The PRI has 
made efforts to ostensibly democratize their candidate selection in recent years, but until 
the early 2000s the party relied entirely on informal decision-making to select and 
nominate candidates. 135  
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 The use of informal decision-making versus primaries for party candidate 
selection is a point of contention in the debate on female representation. When gender 
quotas are not in use, both can be detrimental to the electoral prospects of female 
candidates. Substantial research has shown that female candidates typically have less 
funding and name recognition than their male counterparts.136 Even in the absence of low 
or moderate voter gender biases, these factors can make primaries more challenging for 
women without measures to correct for the historic economic and political disadvantages 
faced by women.137 Alternatively, without quotas, informal decision-making can enable 
male-dominated party leadership to operate clientelist recruitment networks and selection 
procedures that primarily benefit male candidates who are connected to party leaders 
through business or family ties.138 Scholars disagree on which of these mechanisms is 
more disadvantageous for female candidates, but both present substantial barriers for 
women hoping to achieve political office.139 However, when gender quotas are in use, or 
when they are being debated, primaries often prove more damaging to the prospects of 
female candidates. Not only is the use of primaries often a point which critics use to 
oppose the introduction of gender quotas, but also a procedure through which poorly 
designed quotas can fail to increase female representation.140 With this institutional 
context in mind, the analysis turns to the adoption, features, and implementation of the 
gender quota.  
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 Like many other countries where legislated candidate quotas are in use, the 
movement towards gender quotas in Mexico began with voluntary party quotas. In 1990, 
the PRD implemented a small quota for female representation in party leadership, 
believing that a candidate quota would be incompatible with the party’s use of 
primaries.141 However, in the election that followed the PRD fielded the fewest female 
candidates of any other party in Mexico, showing again that weak quotas can be 
ineffectual and even counterproductive.142 As discussed in Chapter One, the introduction 
of a gender quota can often cause a contagion effect among parties as they compete for 
new or changing constituencies.143 Per this theory, in 1993 the PRI adopted a rule that at 
least 30 percent of its candidates should be of a different gender than the other 70 
percent.144 Just one year later, the PRI selected a woman as party president, reflecting 
either shifting attitudes about gender within the party or a concentrated effort to make the 
party more competitive as the pace of democratization increased and PRI’s stronghold on 
the country weakened. Prioritizing party ideology, the conservative PAN resisted 
implementing a gender quota and argued that a quota would compromise the integrity of 
its purportedly democratic candidate selection process.145  
 In response to the new public attention on female representation and failure of 
voluntary quotas to increase the proportion of women in the legislature – by 1997 just 14 
percent of federal legislators were women – female party militants and legislators began 
 
141 Baldez, "Elected Bodies: The Gender Quota Law for Legislative Candidates in Mexico,” 246. 
142 Ibid.  
143 Caul, “Political Parties and the Adoption of Candidate Gender Quotas: A Cross–National Analysis,” 
1216.  
144 Baldez, "Elected Bodies: The Gender Quota Law for Legislative Candidates in Mexico,” 239-41. 
145 Ibid.  
 36 
to form cross-party coalitions to advocate for a legislated candidate gender quota law.146 
Organizing across party lines, in the late 1990s female party members and legislators 
created formal and informal networks in conjunction with women’s civil society groups 
to advocate their position.147 Their initial efforts produced a 1996 national gender quota 
law that recommended that each party ensure that no more than 70 percent of a party’s 
candidates be of a single gender.148 The law was non-binding, carried no enforcement or 
oversight mechanisms, and fell far short of the demands of the women’s groups pushing 
for increased political representation. In fact, from 1996 to 2000 (before a new quota was 
passed) the proportion of women in the legislature actually decreased slightly.149 While 
the PRI and PRD complied with the letter of the law by fielding close to 30 percent 
female candidates, they did so by nominating women to suplente spots.150 In Mexico, two 
candidates are nominated for each seat of a party’s ticket; one as a proprietario (primary) 
and one as a suplente (alternate).151 The suplente only ever takes office if the elected 
proprietario resigns, dies, or is otherwise unable to complete their term.152 When parties 
fulfilled the quota by placing female candidates as suplentes, they guaranteed that almost 
none of those women would actually hold office.153 This background demonstrates that 
women played a significant role in the movement for gender quotas in Mexico, although 
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party politics and competition were are important factors. Further, it is clear that quota 
laws can be rendered largely ineffective not just in the absence of enforcement and 
oversight, but also due to exploitable loopholes in the electoral system. 
 In 1997, women’s coalitions were successful in establishing the bicameral 
Commission on Gender Equality (CIG) in the legislature, the primary institutional vehicle 
for the introduction and eventual adoption of gender quotas and numerous women’s 
interest laws.154 Through continued mobilization and as a result of the institutionalization 
of gender issues in the legislature through the CIG, the first mandatory gender quota law 
was passed in 2002.155 However, this law was only possible after a ruling by the Supreme 
Court upholding a 2001 gender quota passed in the state of Coahuila.156 Coahuila’s quota 
placed a 70 percent limit on the gender proportions of candidate lists for state congress.157 
PAN challenged the law on the grounds that the law disadvantaged male candidates, thus 
violating existing Constitutional protections for gender equality.158 The court ruled that 
the quota was indeed in line with the Constitution, but added that parties that used 
primaries for candidate selection would be exempt.159  
 Through the CIG, quota proponents introduced a law closely resembling 
Coahuila’s. With confirmation that a national gender quota would be Constitutional, and 
in the face of mounting pressure from cross-party and civil society coalitions, the 
 
154 Piscopo, “Beyond Hearth and Home: Female Legislators, Feminist Policy Change, and Substantive 
Representation in Mexico,” 93-94. 
155 Ibid.  
156 Dorothy Estrada-Tanck, “Gender Parity, Legal Pluralism, and Human Rights of Indigenous Women: An 
Outlook from Mexico,” in Gender Parity and Multicultural Feminism: Towards a New Synthesis, eds. Ruth 
Rubio-Marín and Will Kymlicka, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 199–237.  
157 Ibid.  
158 Ibid.  
159 Ibid.  
 38 
legislature passed the law nearly unanimously. However, although the 2002 law was 
considerably stronger than the 1996 quota – in particular, parties were required to place 
women in electable positions on PR lists and could no longer nominate women as 
suplentes to fill the quota – parties continued to find ways to circumvent the law. As a 
result, female representation in the legislature increased 7 percent in the first election 
after the law was passed, but remained below the 30 percent believed to be necessary for 
critical mass, let alone parity, until a series of amendments between 2008 and 2011 
improved the law.  
 Although the 2002 quota law was mandatory, enforcement and oversight 
mechanisms were extremely weak and parties that used primaries to select candidates 
were exempted from the law. This provided a wide degree of agency for party leaders in 
deciding to what extent they would comply with the quota, despite concerns about the 
fairness and transparency of primaries conducted by the PRD and the PAN.160 The 
Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) was nominally responsible for enforcement, oversight, 
and interpretation of the quota but in reality did very little to fulfill these 
responsibilities.161 A particularly egregious example of the methods employed by party 
leaders to circumvent the quota was the “Juanita” scandal.162 Two days after the 2009 
midterm election, eight newly elected legislators resigned from their positions and were 
replaced by their suplentes.163 All of the legislators who resigned were women and almost 
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all of their suplentes were male family members.164 The ensuing scandal and media 
attention revealed that this practice was actually relatively common and a repeat in 2010 
confirmed beliefs that female legislators were pressured by party leaders into resigning 
their seats to men.165  
 Female journalists, legislators, civil society activists, and party members formed a 
group called Mujeres en Plural to advocate for amendments to the quota laws which 
would require each proprietario and suplente pairing to be of a single gender and remove 
the exemption for primaries.166 A bill was introduced and voted down, a petition was 
introduced to the IFE and denied, finally the case was presented to the Federal Electoral 
Tribunal (a federal court overseeing election matters) which ruled in favor of Mujeres en 
Plural in 2011.167 As a result, in 2012 the proportion of female legislators increased 10 
percentage points to 36 percent.168 An amendment in 2014 to raise the quota from 30 
percent to 50 percent has since proved highly effective.169  
 The descriptive success of Mexico’s gender quota was facilitated by features of 
the electoral system. The use of PR, large district magnitudes, and closed candidate lists 
created a system which was highly compatible with a gender quota. However, other 
institutional factors detracted from the quota. Resistance by party leaders and political 
clientelism prevented the full implementation of the law in the early years. Indeed, it was 
 
164 Piscopo, “States as Gender Equality Activists: The Evolution of Quota Laws in Latin America,” 36-37. 
165 Ibid.  
166 Stephanie Froimovich et. al, “Women in Politics: Evidence of Legislative Change.” University of 
Columbia (2013): 1-66. https://sipa.columbia.edu/academics/capstone-projects/women-and-politics-
evidence-legislative-change, 25-26. 
167 Ibid. 
168 “Proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments – Mexico.” The World Bank Group (1990 – 
2019). 
169 Piscopo. “States as Gender Equality Activists: The Evolution of Quota Laws in Latin America.” 41. 
 40 
women’s collaboration, within and across the legislature and civil society, that ensured 




 Although voluntary party gender quotas were popularized in Scandinavia in the 
1970s and 80s, Argentina was the first democratic country to introduce a legislated 
candidate quota.170 Argentina’s 1991 gender quota law was followed by similar laws in 
11 other Latin American countries, in what some scholars have deemed Latin America’s 
Pink Tide.171 It is useful here to highlight some of the features of the Argentine political 
and electoral systems. Although democratization was attained earlier in Argentina than in 
Mexico – 1983, with consolidation in 1989 – authoritarianism in Argentina was 
characterized by military dictatorships alternating with radical populists and high levels 
of violence and state terror.172 Despite economic and political turmoil throughout the 
1980s and 90s,173 Argentina is currently a stable democracy and ranks highly for political 
rights and civil liberties in Freedom House assessments.174  
 The balance of political parties within Argentina is more complex than in Mexico, 
so it is not possible to give a full explanation of the major political parties, their 
ideologies, and how each of these have shifted over the time period discussed in this 
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paper. To provide some context, however, it is important to note that Argentina has a 
long history of popular and powerful Leftist parties. The most prominent of these 
traditions is that of the Peronists, who are typically represented by the Justicialist Party 
(PJ).175 Within the PJ, there are smaller political coalitions such as FREJUPO, FPV, and 
FdT.176 The center-right party, Republican Proposal (PRO), has only won a single 
Presidential election since democratization.177 The Radical Civil Union (UCR) is a 
socialist party that has not won a Presidential election since 1999.178 
 Women’s rights in Argentina were jumpstarted under Juan and Eva Perón. During 
their leadership, women gained the right to vote (1947) and the Peronist Party 
implemented a party quota for its congressional seats (1950).179 As a result, in 1951, 
Argentina’s national legislature was 18 percent women – a remarkable achievement at the 
time.180 This early introduction of gender quotas and unusually high representation for 
women, although short-lived, may have served to establish societal norms concerning the 
rights and representation of women. Further, the electoral success of the Peronist Party 
may have demonstrated that women as a constituency could influence elections. The 
political instability and numerous authoritarian regimes that followed the Peróns makes it 
nearly impossible to confirm these hypotheses, but it should be noted that the history of 
women’s rights and representation was quite different in Argentina than in the other case 
studies.  
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 Argentina has a President and Vice-President, bi-cameral legislature (Chamber of 
Deputies and Senate), and a Supreme Court.181 Like Mexico and Brazil, it is a federal 
system with 24 electoral districts.182 Argentina uses exclusively PR, unlike Mexico’s 
mixed system, that features closed, rank-ordered candidate lists.183 The Chamber of 
Deputies has 257 seats consisting of four year terms that are staggered so that half of the 
Chamber is elected every two years.184 District magnitude varies for the Chamber of 
Deputies as the number of seats is allocated according to the population of each province, 
meaning that some districts have high magnitudes (70 for the Province of Buenos Aires) 
but most have low magnitudes between 5 and 10.185 Each district elects three Senators for 
a total of 72 seats with a relatively small district magnitude. PR for Senate seats is 
structured so that the majority party receives two seats and the party in second-place 
receives one seat.186 Until 2001, Senators were chosen through indirect elections and after 
2001 through the PR system enumerated above.187 Senate terms are six years with a third 
of Senators elected every two years. There are no bans on reelection for seats in the 
legislature or for the Presidency.188  
 The use of closed PR lists allocates enormous power and authority to the party 
leaders who determine and rank candidates.189 In Argentina, this access is typically 
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controlled by state-level party leaders rather than national ones, which differs slightly 
from the power structure in Mexico.190 Further, while Mexico had a ban on reelection 
until 2014, Argentina has always allowed federal legislators to seek reelection with no 
term limits. This creates a number of differences in the incentives for both candidates and 
party leaders. Whereas in Mexico, legislators were only beholden to party leaders if they 
intended to seek a different office after their term, Argentine legislators rely on this 
support in order to seek reelection for the same office.191 Reelection can also present 
challenges for increasing women’s representation. In electoral systems where reelection 
is permitted and the representation of women is low, the incumbency advantage of 
predominately male legislators can make it more difficult for women to attain office.192 
This is more relevant in open list PR and SMD systems, but knowledge of the 
incumbency advantage may also disincentivize party leaders from choosing to run new, 
female candidates to replace incumbent male candidates of the same party even in a 
closed-list system.193 The result of the influence of party leaders over the political careers 
of legislators, exacerbated by the use of closed-list PR systems, is that legislators are 
highly discouraged from challenging party ideology in any way.194  
 Voting against party lines can even result in leaders withholding ballot access or 
being expelled from the party, and this is true in both Argentina195 and Mexico.196 
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Although subsequent chapters will discuss how this dynamic can work against the 
substantive representation of women, in Argentina party leaders’ control over legislator 
voting has actually been attributed to the adoption of the 1991 quota law.197 During 
discussion of the bill, the majority of the legislators from the largest party, the Justicialist 
Party (JP), registered staunch opposition to the bill.198 Leaders of the second largest, UCR 
Party endorsed the bill, ensuring that UCR legislators would vote to in favor of the quota, 
but this would not have been enough to pass the bill.199 It was President Menem’s 
instructions to members of his party, the JP, to vote in favor of the bill that guaranteed its 
passage.200 Even after voting for the bill, many JP legislators entered their objections into 
the legislative transcript, demonstrating the power of party leaders to dictate legislator 
voting.201  
 Prior to the implementation of the quota law, the Ley de Cupos, the legislature 
was just four percent women, although women constituted over 50 percent of registered 
voters and 47 percent of party members.202 In addition to party leaders in the JP and 
UCR, the Ley de Cupos was also supported by a broad and diverse coalition of women, 
including party members, legislators, bureaucrats, journalists, and civil society 
activists.203 Their intense and focused lobbying for the law was likely an important 
motivator in President Menem’s decision to endorse to the bill.204 However, it should be 
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noted that while collaboration with civil society occurred similarly to Mexico, party 
divisions among women remained.205 Participation in the gender quota movement was 
not as ubiquitous among female legislators as in Mexico, and even among supporters 
there was significant disagreement over the details of the quota.206 Support from 
women’s coalitions was crucial in Argentina as in Mexico, but the influence of party 
leaders was more pronounced in the passage of the quota law in Argentina than in 
Mexico. Thus, women’s collaboration emerged as an important variable in garnering 
support for the quota in Argentina, but female legislators were not nearly as united in 
advocating for the quota as they were in Mexico.  
 The 1991 Ley de Cupos mandated that all party lists for the Chamber of Deputies 
contain at least 30 percent women and that the ‘electable’ positions on the candidate lists 
contain a minimum of 30 percent female candidates.207 The law did not apply to the 
Senate at the time because it used indirect elections and was thus exempted from the Ley 
de Cupos. The placement mandate was, however, vague and did not clarify whether 
‘electable’ positions referred to all spots on a party’s candidate lists or only the spots a 
party could reasonably be expected to win.208 As a result, many party leaders complied by 
fielding their 30 percent female candidates in low positions that were unlikely to be 
elected.209 A decree by President Menem on International Women’s Day in 1993 
specified that the 30 percent also applied to positions reasonably expected to be won and 
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outlined the precise number and position of spots that should be allocated to women 
based on the number of seats up for reelection, but failed to convince party leaders.210 
Despite widespread violations of the law in the 1993 election, no sanctions were enforced 
on parties, largely because only those directly affected by non-compliance could bring a 
case against the party – meaning that female candidates would have to publicly challenge 
their party, finance the cost of the legal challenge personally, and effectively sacrifice 
their political careers.211 These challenges were exacerbated by the fact that some judges 
refused to enforce the law on the grounds that it violated the Constitutional principle of 
equality before the law.212   
 Women’s representation in the legislature increased in the election, from 5.8 
percent in the Chamber of Deputies in 1991 to 14.4 percent in 1993 and from 4.2 percent 
in the Senate in 1992 to 6.1 percent in 1995, but further progress could have been made if 
the placement mandate was respected and enforced.213 It should also be considered that 
although the proportion of women in the Chamber of Deputies increased substantially, 
the initial level of representation was very low and the percentage of women after the Ley 
de Cupos was equal to the proportion of women in the entire Mexican legislature 5 years 
prior to their first national quota law. Disappointed by the election results and frustrated 
by the rampant violations of the quota, women’s coalitions again began to rally in support 
of the quota law and worked through the National Women’s Council to bring violations 
to the National Electoral Chamber to ensure enforcement.214 The 1994 Constitutional 
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Assembly was especially critical in ensuring the proper application of the Ley de Cupos. 
The selection of legislators to the Assembly was governed by the quota law, resulting in 
26 percent representation for women.215 Supported by women’s coalitions outside the 
Assembly, female legislators, and some male allies, incorporated the United Nations 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW) into the Constitution and an Article stating that political parties and the 
electoral system will guarantee the real equality of political opportunity between men and 
women through positive action measures that will never be less than those in effect at the 
signing of the Constitution (the Ley de Cupos).216 Another important change to the 
Constitution was the reform to the election system for Senators. The Constitution 
established that the Senate would, starting in 2001, use a PR system rather than indirect 
elections.217 This opened the possibility that the Ley de Cupos would also apply to the 
Senate.  
 Women’s groups launched a sustained legal campaign to ensure this reality and 
although they were ultimately successful, they faced significant resistance.218 Women’s 
efforts leading up to the 1995 election also helped motivate the Attorney General and the 
National Electoral Chamber to begin enforcing the Ley de Cupos.219 Clarifications were 
made regarding the placement mandate, ensuring that female candidates were placed in 
positions that actually were electable even in instances where parties could only expect to 
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win two seats.220 Electoral court judges were ordered to review all candidate lists and 
mandate changes to any that violated the quota, and were even authorized to make such 
changes themselves if party leaders failed to do so.221 Federal prosecutors were ordered to 
monitor the actions of electoral court judges to ensure they complied with these orders.222  
 These efforts were successful and the proportion of women in the Chamber of 
Deputies increased in 1995 to 22 percent, a gain of 7 percentage points from the previous 
election.223 This progress was repeated in 1997, and by 2001 women had reached 30 
percent of the Chamber of Deputies.224 The proportion of female legislators increased to 
40 percent in 2007 and has hovered around that number to date, although a 2017 
amendment to the electoral code increased the quota to 50 percent.225 The application of 
the Ley de Cupos to Senate elections was secured through a Decree in 2000 by President 
de La Rúa.226 Because of the small district magnitude of Senate elections, the Decree 
mandated that one of the first two positions on each party’s Senate candidate lists be a 
woman.227 The representation of women in the Senate jumped from 3 percent in 1999 to 
35.2 percent in 2001.228  
 In short, women’s collaboration was key in ensuring the implementation, 
enforcement, and reform of the quota law. Progress came in steps as women gained more 
influence through the 1991 edition of the quota and the Constitutional Assembly, but the 
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stringent top-down enforcement by government and judicial officials was necessary for 
the Ley de Cupos to be truly effective. Despite efforts by activists and female politicians 
to implement gender quotas beginning just a few years apart, women reached critical 
mass in the Argentine legislature much faster than in Mexico. It is difficult to identify the 
precise causal links of the quick success of Argentina’s Ley de Cupos, but it is worth 
examining some of the key similarities and differences as these will later be used to 
analyze subsequent variations in substantive representation. From an electoral 
perspective, although both countries use closed PR lists, Mexico has a mixed system that 
also incorporates SMDs.229 This creates challenges for female candidates in these 
districts, although the PR lists in Mexico have much larger district magnitude than in 
Argentina which could help offset this effect.230  
 In both countries, the activism and mobilization of women was crucial to passing 
the gender quota law and ensuring its proper implementation. The usage of Presidential 
decrees to legitimize and enforce the Ley de Cupos is likely the most important 
distinguishing factor between Argentina’s and Mexico’s timelines in reaching critical 
mass. However, some features of the electoral system in Argentina are more compatible 
with gender quotas, such as the use of PR with no elements of SMD, and these likely also 
contributed to the faster implementation of the quota.231 The quota law in Mexico did not 
enjoy the same kind of support from top party leaders after its initial passage and 
appropriate enforcement of the law was only made possible through legal battles and 
sustained women’s mobilization. Coalitions including both female legislators and civil 
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society groups played important roles in both countries, but these organizations displayed 
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Chapter Three 
 When Quotas Fall Short: Brazil and Chile  
 
 This chapter examines descriptive representation in Brazil and Chile. Beginning 
with an analysis of the quota laws and their implementation, this chapter compares the 
limited descriptive success of quota laws in Brazil and Chile with the achievements made 
in Argentina and Mexico. By examining the similarities and differences between the two 
sets of case studies in terms of quota law adoption, implementation, and enforcement, this 
chapter will evaluate the relevance of cross-national and contextual variables identified in 
the previous chapter in order to later analyze their role in substantive representation. 
Centering this discussion on Brazil and Chile, this chapter will also contrast efforts by 
quota law supporters with those made in Argentina and Mexico and discuss the role of 




 Although Brazil first implemented a national gender quota law in 1997, requiring 
parties to field no more than 30 percent of either gender on their candidate lists, the 
proportion of women in the legislature remains well below the global average and even 
further below the critical mass threshold.233 Between 1997 and 2020, the percentage of 
women in the legislature increased from 6.6 percent to 14.6 percent.234 It is difficult to 
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attribute this modest increase to the gender quota, as many countries have experienced 
similar, or even more impressive, gains during the same time period. The world average 
proportion of women in national parliaments changed from 11.6 percent in 1997 to 25.2 
percent in 2020.235 This increase is, in part, due to the many countries that began to 
implement legislated gender quotas during this period. However, countries without 
quotas have also experienced rising numbers of female legislators, likely due to changes 
in attitudes about women, increased education and labor force participation, and 
improvements in numerous other factors affecting women’s quality of life and potential 
to compete in legislative races.236 Examples of this can be found in various regions of the 
world and at different levels of development, including Cambodia, India, Ukraine, and 
Zambia.237 Further, there were no notable increases in female representation in Brazil 
until 2003, suggesting that the initial gender quota law was mostly ineffective in 
increasing representation.238 The proportion of candidates that are women has increased a 
result of the quota and hit 30 percent in 2018, but this has not translated into electoral 
successes for women.239 Even in 2003, the increase was just two percentage points from 
the 1997 level. Other changes occurred in 2014, 2017, and 2018.240  
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 The national legislature of Brazil consists of a Chamber of Deputies and a Senate 
which house 513 and 81 legislators, respectively. Deputies are elected from 27 districts 
for four-year terms using open list PR, while Senators are elected from the same districts 
for eight-year terms using a majoritarian, first-past-the-post system. The gender quota 
applies only to seats in the Chamber of Deputies, as in Argentina between 1991 and 
2000. In 1999, nine years after the first national quota was introduce for the Chamber of 
Deputies in Argentina and one year before it would be expanded to the Senate, the 
proportion of women in the Chamber of Deputies was 24 percentage points higher than 
that of the Senate.241 That the proportion of women in the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies 
(15 percent) is roughly the same as the proportion in the Senate (14 percent) further 
supports the assertion that gender quotas in Brazil have had little descriptive impact.242  
 Brazil’s multi-party system relies on coalitions for governance like Argentina, 
which is in contrast to the majority governments that typically hold power in Mexico. 243 
Since 1990, the most popular parties have been the Brazilian Democratic Movement 
(MDB), Brazil Social Democracy Party (PSDB), and the Worker’s Party (PT).244 The 
multi-party system in Brazil is sometimes characterized as unstable and fragile.245 Most 
parties do not have consolidated ideological or political platforms and tend to shift their 
policies and stances on key issues in response to short-term changes in the surrounding 
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political climate.246 Unlike Argentina and Mexico, Brazil uses an open PR system rather 
than a closed one.247 This means that candidate lists are not rank ordered by parties but by 
voters who determine the order of the list. Voters in Brazil have the option of voting 
either for the list as a whole or for individual candidates.248 Voting for individual 
candidates, the preferential vote, is more common than voting for the party list in its 
entirety.249 
  One result of this system is a high degree of intra-party competition among 
candidates that engenders elections in which individual candidates carry much more 
importance than their parties and the personal financial resources of candidates often 
decide the outcome.250 The high district magnitude, which ranges from eight to 70, 
exacerbates this effect. In the 2018 Sao Paolo Chamber of Deputies race, for example, 
1,502 candidates competed for 70 seats.251 One party ran a list of 97 candidates.252 
Further compounding the issue is the provision passed alongside the quota law that 
parties may, but are not required to, run a number of candidates totaling 150 percent of 
the open seats in elections for the Chamber of Deputies.253 The quota applies to the total 
number of potential spots on the candidate lists, regardless of whether parties actually fill 
these spots.254 Marx, Borner, and Caminotti explain that under these rules, if a district has 
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10 seats open then the party can run 15 candidates. If the party ran 15 candidates then 4 
would need to be women, but if the party prefers not to run female candidates it can 
simply choose to only run 11 candidates that are all men. This does not violate the quota 
law, so political parties nearly always have an option to avoid selecting female 
candidates.255 While not illegal, this practice certainly contradicts the spirit of the quota 
law, so parties that wish to appear to comply with this spirit without actually doing so 
have another method.  
 Laranja refers to female candidates in Brazil who are used to meet the gender 
quota but are essentially candidates in name only. They receive little to no support from 
the party and are often unqualified because they are not intended to be serious 
candidates.256 Unable and often unwilling to truly participate in the highly competitive 
races for seats in the Chamber of Deputies, these women have very slim chances of being 
elected.257 In some ways, this practice is similar to the use of female candidates as 
suplentes in Mexico.258 Both strategies are intended to avoid the election of female 
legislators and work to damage the credibility of the quota by artificially injecting 
unqualified female candidates into the political arena. The use of laranjas does not 
appear to be primarily the result of a lack of viable female candidates, but rather gender 
bias in party selection processes.259 A 2008 study of the competitiveness of female 
candidates for the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies found that party ideology was the main 
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predictor of the proportion of competitive female candidates that a party selects.260 The 
study found that left-wing coalitions not only ran the most female candidates, but also ran 
female candidates that were more competitive than the average candidate from any party, 
male or female.261 
 The laranja practice is widespread. Wylie found that in the 2014 elections, 48 
percent of the female candidates for the Chamber of Deputies could be classified as 
laranjas.262 In 2018, this percentage decreased to 35, suggesting some improvement.263 
However, the fact that over one third of female candidates were not running serious 
campaigns or receiving meaningful party assistance in 2018 is deeply troubling and offers 
a compelling explanation for the low proportion of female Deputies in Brazil. 
 Open list PR systems present challenges to effective quota implementation similar 
to those that existed in Argentina and Mexico prior to effective enforcement of placement 
mandates in their closed list PR systems.264 Rather than parties clustering female 
candidates in the bottom positions of candidate lists, as in Argentina and Mexico, voters 
are able to do so themselves by voting for primarily male candidates.265 Thus, the success 
of the gender quotas in Brazil hinges more significantly on voter preferences than in 
Argentina and Mexico. Using Hinjosa’s framework outlined in Chapter One, it can be 
inferred then that while the institutional elements discussed above are important, analysis 
of demand side factors is critical to understanding the continued underrepresentation of 
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women in the Brazilian legislature.266 The primary demand side factor to consider is voter 
preference. This differs from the other case studies in that the open PR system may 
prevent gender quotas from functioning successfully in Brazil, even when parties adhere 
to the rules and quotas are well-designed and enforced. Unfortunately, in Brazil many 
parties are able to exploit loopholes in the quota law, so the challenges created by the 
open list system are compounded and exacerbated. Voter preference in this context refers 
to attitudes of voters about the suitability of women for political office. Due to the large 
percentage of laranja candidates and other efforts by parties to prevent the election of 
female legislators, the electoral success of women in Brazil is not an accurate measure of 
voters’ willingness to vote for female candidates. Instead, public opinion polls are needed 
to shed light on these attitudes and preferences.  
 A 2010 Pew Research Center survey found that 70 percent of men and 71 of 
women in Brazil viewed the election of a female president favorably.267 This was 
confirmed with the election of Dilma Roussef as President in 2011. The 2014 
AmericasBarometer survey showed that 32 percent of Brazilians agreed with the use of 
legislated gender quotas and 28 percent strongly agreed.268 Strikingly, a hypothetical 
ballot study of 600 people living in São Paolo revealed a seven percentage point bias in 
favor of female candidates.269 These results suggest that although gender inequality 
 
266 Hinojosa, “Why Selection Matters: Explaining Women’s Representation in Politics,” 22. 
267 Richard Wike, “Public Opinion in Brazil: Findings from the Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes 
Project,” Wilson Center, accessed January 22, 2021, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/public-opinion-
brazil-findings-the-pew-research-centers-global-attitudes-project. 
268 Frederico Batista Pereira and Nathália F. F. Porto, “Gender Attitudes and Public Opinion Towards 
Electoral Gender Quotas in Brazil,” Political Psychology 41, no. 5 (2020): 887–99, 
https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12655, 892.  
269 Rosario Aguilar, Saul Cunow, and Scott Desposato, “Choice Sets, Gender, and Candidate Choice in 
Brazil,” Electoral Studies 39 (September 1, 2015): 230–42, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2015.03.011, 
235.  
 58 
persists in Brazil, voters are willing to support qualified female candidates and the 
majority agree with the use of gender quotas.270 This is consistent with public opinion 
about the suitability of women as politicians in studies that survey all of Latin America. 
These results also confirm assertions made throughout the literature that although voter 
preference and negative attitudes about women are a factor, they are far less significant 
than institutional factors.271 In general, the costs that party leaders perceive in running 
female candidates are much higher than the actual costs and higher than public opinion 
surveys suggest.272  
 Additionally, while supply side factors play a role in all of the case studies, they 
are most relevant in Brazil. The financial costs of running a successful political campaign 
present a more intractable barrier in Brazil (and Chile) than in the other case studies 
because candidates must compete for voter’s attention with other candidates on the same 
party list. Gendered differences in income are prevalent around the world and in Brazil. 
Not only is the wage-gap approximately 20 percent in Brazil, female labor force 
participation is also low (54 percent) and women are concentrated in low-paying 
positions in the service and tourism sectors.273 Between 2014 and 2018 the average 
campaign funding of white male candidates was two and half times higher than the 
funding of white female candidates.274 The gap in funding between Afro-descendant 
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women and white men was significantly higher.275 Much of this funding is self-financed 
and some is collected from donations.276 The 2015 ban on corporate contributions to 
federal deputy races has helped narrow this gap, but it remains high.277 However, gender 
equality progress on a number of fronts in Brazil has led to a large pool of eligible and 
aspirant female candidates.278  
 Over 44 percent of political party members in Brazil are women279 and 52 percent 
of voters in the most recent election were women, although it should be noted that voting 
is compulsory.280 A 2018 study by Instituto Locomotiva and UN Women revealed that 
the majority of Brazilian women are interested in politics and in increasing the 
representation of women in the political sphere.281 The study found that over 90 percent 
of women believed that there should be more female representation in politics and that 
they were not adequately represented by current politicians.282 Over 70 percent said that 
they felt their vote could have an impact and that they were interested in politics.283 
Further, although women are less likely to work than men, they are more likely to have 
received a tertiary degree of some kind.284 These results support the claim that supply 
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side barriers to increased representation in Brazil stem more from financial and perceived 
institutional barriers than from a lack of interested or qualified candidates.  
 Brazil’s quota law makes some efforts to correct for demand and supply side 
disadvantages for female candidates. In 2009, the original law was amended to add 
provisions concerning the use of party funds and televised air time.285 Political parties in 
Brazil are allocated free broadcast time to advertise their platform and candidates during 
election years. Per the 2009 amendment, parties were required to devote a minimum of 
10 percent of this time to promoting women’s political participation.286 This has since 
increased to 15 percent of their free broadcast time. Parties must further allocate at least 
five percent of their public campaign funds to the same purpose.287 Non-compliance 
results in a fine equivalent to 12.5 percent of the funds that were supposed to have been 
spent on advocating the political participation of women.288 Additionally, during the 
election campaign season, the Superior Electoral Court airs five minutes of educational 
campaigns about women’s political participation per day.289 These provisions should play 
an important role in supporting the success of the gender quota law and educating voters 
about the significance of female political participation. It is not clear from that these aims 
have been achieved. The wording of “promoting women’s political participation” is 
vague.290 Parties can choose whether they promote their own female candidates or 
whether they use it to deliver standardized messages about gender equality in politics. 
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Although political parties are not legally allowed to purchase additional television or 
radio advertisement, political parties still focus the vast majority of their advertisement 
time on male candidates.291  
 There are numerous factors contributing to the low political representation of 
women in Brazil, but the most compelling explanatory variables put forth in the literature 
thus far are institutional. The open list PR system and the allowance for parties to run 
candidates numbering 150 percent of available seats are electoral features that 
disadvantage female candidates.292 Under these conditions, female candidates that are not 
electoral ‘ringers’ require significant investment from party leaders who seem reluctant to 
provide this kind of support.293 The quota law is self-sabotaging in that it applies only to 
the seats a party fills and that there are no oversight or enforcement mechanisms 
concerning the laranja practice.294 The weak nature and many loopholes of the gender 
quota law combined with certain features of the electoral system and the apparent lack of 
will by party leaders to genuinely support increased female representation creates a 
perfect storm in which it would be surprising if the quota was effective. All of these 
factors create barriers for women in moving from aspirant to candidate and from 
candidate to office holder, but they also prevent women from transitioning from eligible 
to aspirant. Despite an interest in politics, women are held back from becoming aspiring 
candidates by the blatant and overwhelming evidence that party leaders do not want 
serious female candidates, that women receive less support from their parties, and that 
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women have lower electoral success.295 These challenges mount on top of the other issues 
women in Brazil face, such as femicide, domestic abuse, a high wage gap, and the 
‘double shift’ of wives and mothers, to make running for office a nearly Herculean task. 
 However, institutional variables alone may not be enough to explain the lack of 
reform and commitment to adequate enforcement of the quota law in Brazil. Similar 
issues were initially apparent in both Argentina and Mexico and were subsequently 
resolved. In understanding why this process has not occurred in Brazil, it is necessary to 
examine why it did happen in Argentina and Mexico. The answer in both cases rests 
largely with the sustained activism of women’s coalitions, including both legislators and 
civil society groups, to ensure the proper implementation of gender quotas in both letter 
and spirit. These movements formed in the initial push for quotas in both countries. 
However, such a movement never came about in Brazil. In explaining how a quota law 
was passed without this support Arújo states, “It must be mentioned that their 
introduction [gender quotas] did not stem from a position of consensus or a maturity of 
the debate in Brazilian society, but, rather, from the absence of both.”296 By this, Arújo 
means that little debate took place over the passage of gender quotas because many party 
leaders and legislators did not even consider the issue to be fundamentally about gender 
parity.297 Rather, quotas were understood by many as vague, possibly temporary, 
methods of promoting the legitimacy of the nascent democracy.298 It is thus not surprising 
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that even many Brazilian feminists were divided on the topic.299 As a result, no 
movement or coalitions formed to advocate for the law, so none were available after the 




 Chile is the last of the four case studies to have implemented a national legislated 
gender quota. The quota, introduced in 2015 as part of a larger constitutional amendment, 
requires political parties to field no more than 60 percent of either gender on their 
candidate lists for the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate.300 Women currently comprise 
23 percent of legislators in both.301 Prior to the implementation of the quota, women 
represented approximately 16 percent of the legislature. After just one national election 
cycle, this increased to 23 percent.302 The next elections will occur in November 2021. 
Notably, the gender quota was passed during the second term of Chile’s first female 
president, Michelle Bachelet. President Bachelet advocated for measures to improve 
gender equality throughout both her terms in office, and her support for the quota and 
immense efforts in passing the 2015 constitutional amendment package were 
undoubtedly crucial in the adoption of Chile’s gender quota.303  
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 The later adoption of the gender quota in Chile leaves less data with which to 
evaluate its descriptive success. However, it is possible to compare the rate of change in 
women’s representation in the first election cycle with the quota with the changes seen in 
Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico. The first election cycles after quotas were introduced in 
Argentina, Mexico, and Brazil yielded +148,304 +60,305 and -10306 percent changes, 
respectively, in the proportion of women in each Chamber of Deputies. In Chile, the 
percent increase in women’s representation in the Chamber of Deputies after one election 
cycle was 43 percent.307 These numbers show that Chile’s gender quota has initially been 
successful, but less so than Argentina and Mexico. However, it is important to consider 
that Chile’s level of female representation prior to the quota was much higher than in 
Argentina and Mexico. The Chilean case provides a valuable opportunity to examine how 
accumulated regional knowledge and evidence on gender quotas influences the 
implementation of quotas. The initial success of the quota in Chile also suggests that 
Brazil’s limited changes in women’s representation cannot be attributed wholly to the use 
of open list PR, which is used in Chile, as well. Further, the overall degree of gender 
equality in Chile and the circumstances surrounding the adoption of the quota law present 
critical information for deciphering the connection between descriptive and substantive 
representation and the role of gender quotas in increasing substantive representation.  
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 The 2015 constitutional amendment package introduced a number of significant 
changes to the electoral system in Chile. Both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate 
increased in size, from 120 to 155 and from 38 to 50, respectively.308 Significant 
redistricting also took place. Prior to 2015, there were 60 districts for Deputies and 19 for 
Senators and each district elected two Deputies and two Senators.309 While this system 
also used open list PR, the small district size resulted in a binomial system wherein each 
party (or coalition) was only allowed to present two candidates per district.310 This 
created a number of electoral and political issues especially in light of the coalition-style 
governance practiced in Chile.311 The increased district size achieved in 2015 made 
negotiations over candidate lists much easier for the seven-party coalition in power at the 
time.312 Further, these reforms reduced the incumbency advantage experienced in the old 
system and made elections more competitive by creating more space for smaller and non-
coalition parties.313 These results are favorable to female candidates, as the literature 
explains that small district magnitude314 and high incumbency advantage315 are key 
barriers to increased women’s representation. It is likely that a gender quota introduced 
into the pre-2015 electoral system would have engendered very few gains in women’s 
representation because the binomial system created conditions in which parties needed to 
nominate highly financed candidates with name recognition to be successful.316  
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 It is important to note that in Chile, as in Brazil, no prominent movement emerged 
to advocate for gender quotas. Certainly, the measure had many supporters in the 
legislature and among voters, but there was no formation of coalitions to lobby for the 
quota.317 The introduction of the quota was, in many ways, a top-down initiative. With 
President Bachelet as a staunch supporter and her party firmly in the majority, there was 
no need for such a movement. Furthermore, female legislators in Chile were deeply 
divided on the issue of gender quotas, which is discussed more thoroughly in Chapter 
Five.318 So, the process of designing, implementing, and enforcing the gender quota 
occurred without the cross-party, cross-sectional women’s collaboration that defined this 
process in Argentina and Mexico.  
 There are a number of important features of the Chilean gender quota. Notably, 
women must constitute at least 40 percent of each candidate list which is much higher 
than the initial quotas in the other three case studies.319 Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico 
started with 30 percent quotas. As the quotas proved effective in Argentina320 and 
Mexico,321 this number increased to 50 percent. There has been no change in Brazil, 
likely because it has yet to meet the 30 percent target.322 Much like the early rendition of 
the Mexican quota, Chilean parties may be exempted from the quota if they use primaries 
to select their candidates.323 However, the quota sets a limit on the number of candidates 
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that can be chosen through primaries, likely to prevent the same issues this provision 
caused in Mexico. Up to 40 percent of a party’s candidates may be selected through 
primaries, but at least 60 percent must be selected by party leaders.324 This allows parties 
to give voters more influence over their candidates, but also ensures that regardless of 
which candidates voters choose parties will still be able to select enough female 
candidates to fulfill the quotas. 
 Unlike in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico, the quota law in Chile directly 
incentivizes political parties to nominate and support female candidates with electoral 
potential.325 Parties receive a state-funded grant of approximately 20,000 USD for each 
female candidate that wins a seat in the Chamber of Deputies or the Senate.326 This 
provision rewards parties for investing time and resources into female candidates and 
discourages parties from running non-viable candidates to fill the quota. The use of a 
positive incentive for nominating competitive female candidates is especially important 
because the 2015 amendment also allowed parties to nominate candidates totaling the 
total number of open seats plus one.327 This creates similar challenges for women as the 
150 percent rule in Brazil, but on a smaller scale which is counteracted somewhat by the 
financial rewards of investing in strong female candidates.  
 The most unique feature of the Chilean quota law is the time limit placed on its 
implementation. No other gender quotas in Latin America are temporary.328 The 2015 
amendment specified that the quota would apply only to four elections, beginning in 2017 
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and ending in 2029.329 There are two potential reasons for the time limit which are at 
odds with each other, but most likely worked in conjunction when the law was passed. 
First, proponents of the quota were optimistic that with the other electoral reforms being 
permanent only a few elections cycles with the quota would be needed for women’s 
representation to increase dramatically and remain at high levels.330 Second, legislators 
who opposed the law on the grounds that gender quotas are ‘undemocratic,’ ineffective, 
result in the selection of underqualified female candidates, etc., may have advocated 
intensely for, or been appeased by, the time limit.331 Current research does not show a 
definitive answer on why the quota is temporary, but scholars argue that once the time is 
up it is highly unlikely that the quota will ever be re-introduced.332 To renew the quota 
would require another revision to the electoral code, yet it took 20 attempts at reforming 
the code to pass the first gender quota.333  
 The initial success of the gender quota in Chile despite the use of open list PR 
means that further examination of the claim that gender quotas are significantly hindered 
by open PR systems is needed. While Brazil as a case study supports this claim, Chile 
does not. Richard Matland’s research on factors affecting quota implementation in 
developed and developing countries provides a solid hypothesis as to why the effects of 
open list PR seem to vary between the two case studies. Matland’s study used a statistical 
analysis of the correlations between the percentage of women in the national legislature 
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and female labor force participation, women’s “cultural standing,” level of development, 
and electoral system in two data sets.334 The first data set was comprised of 24 
industrialized democracies, the second was 16 less developed democracies.335 He found 
that the electoral system variable (PR or majoritarian) was statistically significant and 
positive in the industrialized democracies, but not in the less developed democracies.336   
 Essentially, the positive correlation between PR systems and women’s 
representation observed in many studies was true in developed democracies but not 
necessarily in developing countries. To explain this result, Matland suggests that the 
incentive system for parties to gender balance tickets in PR systems functions differently 
in industrialized countries than in developing ones. While including women in candidate 
lists allows parties to broaden their constituencies and appeal to female and progressive 
voters in some PR systems, he argues that this effect is dampened in developing countries 
where, “the perceived costs of nominating women are so great that parties prefer to run 
virtually all-male slates.”337 Matland explains that political costs for nominating women 
arise when negative attitudes towards women’s capacity as legislators are common, 
women do not constitute a large voter base, and movements for increased female 
representation are inactive or non-vocal.338  
 Although Matland’s study considers the relationship between women’s 
representation and PR systems in general, it is possible to draw a line from his findings to 
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the question of why open list PR is seemingly a hindrance in Brazil and not in Chile. 
While PR systems are positively correlated with women’s representation in many 
countries, this effect is much more pronounced in closed list systems than in open 
ones.339 If his conclusion that the perceived costs of nominating women are so high in 
developing countries that they can counteract the otherwise positive effects of PR 
systems is accurate, then a logical argument can be made that in Brazil the combination 
of open lists and high perceived costs of running female candidates severely reduces the 
efficacy of the gender quota. In Chile, where the gender quota seems to be functioning in 
an open list system, it is likely that the perceived costs of placing female candidates in 
electable spots are much lower than in Brazil. Evaluating the accuracy of this claim 
requires understanding why parties in Brazil and Chile perceive these costs differently 
and how parties are involved in the underrepresentation of women.  
 Perceived costs of nominating female candidates can come in many forms. The 
two most important to consider are electoral costs to the party (voter preference and 
competitiveness of female candidates) and costs to male politicians who may lose their 
seat to female candidates. The latter cost is widely cited as one of the primary reasons 
that the Chilean gender quota was not passed until 2015 despite decades of advocacy 
work and many legislative attempts at a quota.340 However, the majority of Chileans have 
supported the use of a gender quota since at least 2006 when a poll showed that over 70 
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percent of respondents agreed with a quota that was being proposed at the time.341 One 
way to evaluate gender bias in voters, other than through surveys, is to examine the 
electoral success of male and female incumbents with similar qualifications and levels of 
competitiveness. Shair-Rosenfield and Hinjosa did this in a 2014 study of Chile and 
found that female incumbents were three percent more likely to be re-elected than male 
incumbents.342 The study also examined re-nomination of both incumbent men and 
women and non-incumbent men and women. Non-incumbent in this context does not 
refer to new candidates, but rather candidates who have previously held the seat, lost it in 
an election, and want to run for it again.343 They found that incumbent women were two 
percentage points more likely to be re-nominated than their male counterparts.344 For 
non-incumbents, women were four percentage points less likely to be re-nominated than 
men.345 
  These results suggest that party leaders are willing to support female candidates 
through nomination when they have a proven record of success. In fact, parties are 
slightly more likely to nominate women who have performed well electorally than men 
who have done the same, although the difference is not statistically significant.346 The 
study also reveals that when experience, qualification, and competitiveness are equal, 
Chilean voters do not exhibit gender bias in their voting.347 Overall, it appears that the 
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nomination behavior of party leaders and the voting patterns of Chileans are strategic 
rather than dominated by gender biases.348 Political parties do not perceive a greater cost 
in nominating female candidates of equal competitive value to male candidates. Without 
a similar study having been done in Brazil, it is difficult to make a direct comparison. 
However, the behavior of party elites in so actively trying to circumvent the gender 
quota, sometimes in ways that seem to be actually detrimental to the electoral success of 
the party, such as using laranjas instead of competitive female candidates, shows that 
party leaders in Brazil sometimes prioritize gender bias over strategic choices.349 While 
this may help to explain some of the gap between female representation in Brazil and 
Chile, it provides no information about potential bias in the nomination processes for 
political newcomers, where perceived costs may be greater for female candidates.  
 Bjarnegård and Zetterberg observe throughout Latin America that political parties 
that have formal, bureaucratized candidate selection processes increase their proportion 
of female candidates, on average, by 88 percent when a gender quota is introduced, 
whereas parties that have informal selection processes see an increase of just 22 
percent.350 They characterize nearly all political parties in Chile as using highly informal 
selection processes, which is in line with other conclusion from the literature.351  
Although some scholars remark that formal selection processes can disadvantage female 
candidates this is usually in reference to primaries. The regulation of the percentage of 
 
348 Shair-Rosenfield and Hinojosa, “Does Female Incumbency Reduce Gender Bias in Elections?,” 857-58.  
349 Miguel, “Political Representation and Gender in Brazil,” 210-12.  
350 Elin Bjarnegård and Pär Zetterberg, “Political Parties and Gender Quota Implementation: The Role of 
Bureaucratized Candidate Selection Procedures,” Comparative Politics 48, no. 3 (2016): 393–411, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.5129/001041516818254400, 404-05.  
351 Ibid, 401.  
 73 
candidates that can be elected under primaries in Chile helps to ensure that their use does 
not impede the nomination of enough female candidates to fulfill the quota. In the 2017 
election, approximately 42 percent of candidates for the Chamber of Deputies and 41 
percent for the Senate were women, suggesting that parties largely complied with the 
gender quota.352 However, the disparity between the percentage of female candidates and 
women that were elected necessitates examining whether party selection methods 
produced a high number of less qualified female candidates in Chile, as they did in 
Brazil.  
 In the 2013 elections, nearly 21 percent of female candidates for the Chamber of 
Deputies were elected and 33 percent of women that ran for the Senate were elected.353 
By comparison, 27 percent of male candidates were elected to the Chamber of Deputies 
and 29 percent to the Senate.354 In 2017, nine percent of female candidates and 21 percent 
of male candidates for the Chamber of Deputies were successful women.355 For the 
Senate, 19 percent of female candidates and 42 percent of men were elected.356 Although 
the redistricting that took place in 2015 makes it difficult to compare how the 
competitiveness of candidates overall changed between 2013 and 2017, it is possible to 
evaluate changes in the competition gap between men and women in the two election 
cycles. Before the gender quota was implemented, female candidates were being elected 
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at similar rates to their male counterparts. After the quota, the competitive gap between 
men and women widened considerably for both chambers.  
 Studies of other countries in Latin America, including Mexico, have observed that 
the proportion of female candidates that are highly qualified and very competitive 
sometimes dips in the first one or two election cycles after the implementation of a 
gender quota.357 Scholars attribute this effect to gender biased recruitment and selection 
processes which, in the absence of a quota, allow only the most competitive women to be 
nominated.358 The ability of parties to identify viable female candidates and the 
willingness of qualified women to self-select and put themselves forward for nomination 
also take time to grow. It is possible that some specificities of Chilean candidate selection 
procedures have exacerbated this issue. Franceschet notes that final decisions on 
candidate nominations, for those not selected through primaries, are made not by party 
leaders, but at the level of the national coalition.359 This decision-making process is 
highly informal and is led by non-elected elites, mostly men, from the various parties of 
the coalition360. The nature of these negotiations makes it extremely difficult for 
advocates of increased female representation to have their voices heard at the highest 
level.361 Further, the distance of the national coalition from local party organizers may 
impede efforts to scout and recruit potential new female candidates.  
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 Although the proportion of women in the Chilean legislature increased less 
rapidly in the first election cycle after the gender quota than in Argentina and Mexico, 
there is reason to be optimistic about the potential for women’s representation to reach 
the 40 percent target within the time frame set by the quota. The open list system leaves 
some of the outcome up to voters, but public opinion polls and the presence of women in 
other important elected and appointed positions suggests that this will not be a significant 
barrier. Further, parties are complying with the law and have strong financial incentives 
to continue doing so. The primary concern with Chile’s gender quota is that it will expire 
after the 2029 elections. Other changes to the electoral code, such as redistricting and the 
end of the binomial system, will remain and should continue to facilitate the nomination 
and election of women. How the representation of women evolves in Chile over the next 
15 to 20 years will provide a great deal of insight into the impact of gender quotas and the 
strength of the connection between descriptive and substantive representation. If Chile 
reaches the 40 percent target and is able to maintain this after the quota expires, this will 
demonstrate that gender quotas can meaningfully change the gender dynamics of the 
political sphere.   
 While Chile’s gender quota has been more successful than Brazil’s thus far, 
neither quota emerged as a result of popular mobilization or collective women’s activism. 
In both countries, the quota was achieved through top-down approaches in which little 
substantive debate was undertaken. For Brazil, this has resulted in a lack of political will 
to reform the flawed law or to even adequately enforce the current law, so descriptive 
representation has not increased. In Chile, the quota was introduced as a temporary 
measure, and it is still uncertain whether the results will be long-lasting. Chapter five will 
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explore how these dynamics have influenced the substantive representation of women in 























Chapter Four  
Substantive Representation at Critical Mass: Mexico and Argentina 
 
 This chapter examines the extent and quality of substantive representation in 
Argentina and Mexico. Critical mass theory argues that female legislators in a chamber 
with 30 percent women should be able to effectively formulate and advance policy goals 
that reflect women’s interests.362 With 40 and 48 percent women in their respective 
national legislatures, these two case studies have not only reached critical pass, but also 
surpassed it by a significant margin.363 Thus, Argentina and Mexico provide valuable 
opportunities to interrogate the link between descriptive and substantive representation. 
There are a number of ways to measure and interpret substantive representation, as 
discussed in the introduction of this paper. In doing so, it is important to distinguish 
between the willingness of female legislators to work towards women’s interests and 
their ability to do so effectively. The introduction clarifies the use of the term ‘women’s 
interests’ as it is used in this paper and explains why a value-neutral approach has been 
adopted. However, this chapter will distinguish between policies that align with 
conventional feminist views and those that do not when appropriate. It is also important 
to note here that the lens this chapter uses to analyze the substantive representation of 
women is only one of many different and valid perspectives. This chapter, and the next, 
focus on how female legislators represent women, but of course male legislators are also 
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able to represent women’s interests. Examining how male legislators’ preferences, voting 
patterns, and bill sponsorship has changed as a result of gender quotas would be an 
excellent way to study the symbolic effects of gender quotas in generating widespread 
cultural shifts. 
 To evaluate the willingness of female legislators to act in women’s interests, this 
chapter uses data on bill sponsorship and introduction, legislator views and attitudes, and 
organizations for women’s collaboration. Examining the ability of female legislators to 
achieve women’s interests, this chapter looks at formal and informal women’s 
institutions, the presence of women in decision-making roles such as sub-committees and 
positions in the executive branch, and the success rates of women’s interest bills. Finally, 
this chapter endeavors to clarify the links between descriptive and substantive 
representation through connecting the successes and failures of substantive representation 




 The World Economic Forum releases an annual Global Gender Gap Index in 
which countries receive scores from 0 (imparity) to 1 (parity) according to four topics: 
Economic participation, Educational attainment, Health and survival, and Political 
empowerment.364 Between the first year data was collected in 2006 and 2020, Mexico has 
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increased its score from 0.65 to 0.75.365 As a result, it has moved from the 75th most equal 
country in terms of gender equality to the 25th.366 This impressive achievement is due 
almost entirely to improvements in the political empowerment score, which has more 
than tripled since 2006, with minor gains in economic participation.367 The empowerment 
score is based largely on the percentage of women in the national legislature. There is 
also one data point for number of year under a female head of state, which is zero for 
Mexico. Examining these figures, it is apparent that despite increases in ‘political 
empowerment,’ there have been very few improvements for women in education, health, 
or employment.368 Other persistent gender inequalities in Mexico include the high rates 
of femicide, sexual assault, and domestic violence.369 More troubling is that some of 
these issues have worsened even as women’s political opportunities have improved. Over 
the past five years, for example, instances of femicide have increased by 137 percent.370  
 These figures all suggest that there is considerable work to be done in terms of 
promoting gender equality and, more broadly, women’s interests. While equal 
representation is itself a worthy goal, it may seem meaningless to women who continue 
to suffer from, and lose their lives due to, continued gender inequality. It has been nine 
years since women reached critical mass in Mexico and three since gender parity was 
achieved in the legislature, so there is significant data to draw upon in evaluating 
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women’s substantive representation.371 After this length of time, it could be reasonably 
expected to see improvements in the other indicators expressed above, but the Mexican 
case necessitates understanding the limitations of the state. On some issues, the ability of 
legislators to affect real change is challenged by problems with the funding and 
enforcement of laws. Current levels of violence, the strength of non-state actors, and high 
levels of poverty in some areas may place constraints on the efficacy of women’s interest 
legislation even if substantive representation is high. The same can be said of Brazil in 
the next chapter.  
 In analyzing substantive representation, it is important to discuss the vehicles and 
mechanisms for women’s interest legislation in Mexico. The extensive involvement of 
female legislators in the adoption of the gender quota in Mexico led to the creation of a 
number of formal and informal cross-partisan venues for discussing issues of women’s 
rights and representation. Although there is no formal Women’s Caucus in the legislature, 
female Deputies and Senators established the ‘informal’ Women’s Parliament of Mexico 
(PMM) in 1998.372 The PMM meets annually and includes legislators, civil society 
members, journalists, and academics.373 It regularly works with legislative committees on 
issues relating to gender equality and gender mainstreaming. Collaboration through the 
PMM also led to the establishment of the bicameral Commission on Gender Equality 
(CIG).374 Membership in the CIG is restricted to women, and the committee enjoys 
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significant latitude in legislative powers.375 Like most committees in the Mexican 
congress, the CIG is able to author and sponsor bills, but it also has legislative review 
power.376 Draft bills are often sent to the CIG for gendered review of language and 
potential impact. For bills dealing with certain topics this review process is mandatory. 
The CIG is also distinct from women’s groups in many other legislatures around the 
world in that it is generally well-regarded by both male and female politicians.377 While 
Women’s Caucuses and similar organizations in many legislatures struggle to attract 
female legislators – due to concerns about negative reception from their male 
counterparts and being ‘pigeon-holed’ into only worked on issues relating to women and 
children – the CIG is popular among women from a variety of political parties, including 
the conservative PAN.378 The PMM and the CIG are significant components of 
substantive representation, and of understanding substantive representation, for several 
reasons.   
 The establishment of these bodies is a testament to the efficiency and solidarity of 
the movement for women’s political representation; these bodies were a major step 
towards quota adoption in Mexico and the result of the strong political will of female 
legislators. The PMM and the CIG continue to serve as venues for cross-party 
mobilization on a number of issues, including reproductive rights, violence against 
women, and economic policies to support women.379 Notably, the inclusion and activity 
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of conservative female legislators from the late 1990s to the current day demonstrates the 
ability of female legislators to overcome partisan divides and work as a unified 
movement when necessary.380 The majority of women’s interest bills introduced in 
Mexico originate directly or indirectly from the PMM and the CIG, meaning that these 
bodies are also legislative powerhouses for women’s substantive representation.381 The 
significance of all of this is that female legislators have organizations through which to 
leverage their critical mass and the political will and savvy to do so even in spite of 
partisan divides.  
 Piscopo notes, however, that while the wide policy remits and consensus-building 
norms of the CIG lend a wide policy scope and significant degree of political capability 
for female legislators, the CIG does not encourage policy depth.382 Essentially, the high 
degree of institutionalization of the CIG and its cross-partisan nature allow female 
legislators to act as a collective to promote gender mainstreaming on a spectrum of 
policy issues. However, these same qualities prevent the CIG from serving as a vehicle 
for feminist change. This perspective aligns with the observable outcomes of the CIG. 
While its members have made a great deal of progress on issues where ideological and 
partisan differences are negligible or can be easily overcome, such as violence against 
women or gendered development plans, more controversial topics, such as abortion, are 
often avoided.383  
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 Although some scholars point to the issue of abortion as an illustration of the 
limits of female substantive representation in Mexico, Piscopo notes that the reluctance 
of the CIG to act on reproductive rights can be perceived as a function of ideological and 
partisan divides among women rather than oppression of female legislators by male party 
leaders.384 Lopreite concurs, noting that Mexico’s political climate is distinct from many 
other Latin American countries in the highly programmatic nature of its political parties 
and the steep ideological divides between them.385 This, she adds, has prevented progress 
on some feminist issues at the national level, although increased representation of women 
in leftist parties, such as the PRD, and the continued mobilization of women’s civil 
society groups has led to tangible outcomes at the subnational level in territories 
controlled by left-leaning parties.386 Later portions of this chapter will discuss the role of 
party politics and the relative power of female legislators compared to their male 
counterparts. The most important aspects of the CIG are that female legislators in Mexico 
have a committee with substantial legislative powers that is focused solely on gender 
equality and not, for example, women and children.  
 The CIG provides an excellent policy environment for women’s interests, but do 
female legislators face marginalization in bill sponsorship and passage and how are they 
represented in other legislative committees? Kerevel and Atkeson conducted a study in 
2013 of the legislative success and representation of women in the Mexican Chamber of 
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Deputies between 2000 and 2009.387 In 2000, women constituted 16 percent of the 
Chamber.388 By 2009, 27 percent of Deputies were women.389 Examining bill 
sponsorship, the study found that throughout the three legislative terms measured, men 
and women sponsored bills at comparable rates and that there was no significant change 
in the relative sponsorship of bills by gender due to the gender quota.390 These results 
contradict the ‘backlash’ theory advanced by some opponents of critical mass, who argue 
that the increased representation of women causes male legislators to marginalize their 
female counterparts more than before the introduction of quotas.391 However, the results 
also do not provide evidence for increase legislative relevance or activity of female 
Deputies after the quota. 
 Kerevel and Atkeson also found that there were no statistically significant 
discrepancies in bill passage rates between male and female Deputies across the three 
legislative periods.392 Moreover, the study revealed that women’s interest bills passed 
floor votes at a much higher rate than other bills.393 These results do not speak to the final 
success of bill sponsored by women, as all bills must receive a majority in both Chambers 
and be approved by the President. However, this study suggests that bill sponsorship and 
success in the Chamber of Deputies is similar for men and women, that this has not 
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changed significantly as a result of the gender quota, and that women’s interest bills are 
not stifled by male Deputies. These findings would benefit greatly from a similar study 
examining legislative behavior over the past 12 years, but, unfortunately, such research is 
not currently available.  
 Analyzing where women are represented in the Mexican legislature, numerous 
studies have found that the distribution of legislative power is not equal between men and 
women. Male legislators are slightly more likely to be members of party leadership than 
their female counterparts.394 Further, although men and women occupy similar numbers 
of leadership positions in the legislature, women are underrepresented in high prestige 
legislative committees, particularly those concerning economics and finance.395 Instead, 
female legislators are concentrated in low prestige committees, especially those relating 
to social welfare. In the executive branch, women have been historically 
underrepresented in cabinet positions.396 Although President Lopez-Obrador’s current 
cabinet is 50 percent women,397 this can be understood to be a product of the left-leaning 
policies of his political party, the National Regeneration Movement, rather than a general 
trend towards increased representation of women in executive positions. Since 2000, 
President Lopez-Obrador’s cabinet is the first to contain more than three women at any 
one time.398 Zetterberg demonstrates that there is little evidence for a ‘role model effect’ 
in executive positions at the national or subnational level in Mexico, explaining that the 
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ban on re-election until 2015, prevalence of clientelism, and deeply entrenched male-
dominated political networks all continue to work against women in positions outside the 
legislature.399 
 Having established that a powerful legislative vehicle exists for women’s interest 
legislation, that female Deputies sponsor bills and get them passed at similar rates to their 
male counterparts, and that increased representation in the legislature has not translated 
perfectly to increased representation in executive positions at the national or subnational 
level, it is now important to examine women’s interest bills in Mexico. Studies 
examining specifically the passage of women’s interests bill in Mexico were not located. 
Scholars analyzing bill introduction note that party leaders are able to maintain control 
over voting behavior through roll-call voting, which allows legislators to introduce bills 
with a high degree of autonomy as bills are typically unable to advance without support 
from party leaders.400 This feature of the Mexican political environment limits the ability 
of female legislators to vote in favor of women’s interests, but allows for the introduction 
of a wide array of bills. However, as party platforms and the balance of power between 
political parties have shifted new opportunities for more progressive women’s interest 
legislation may have opened.  
 Two studies on bill introduction allow for examination of the periods 1997-2009 
and 2015-2019. Piscopo’s 2014 study covers the first period, finding a statistically 
significant correlation between the proportion of women in the legislature and the 
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percentage of women’s interest bills introduced.401 Further, female legislators do seem to 
represent women’s interests much more than male legislators, sponsoring 73 percent of 
such bills between 1997 and 2009.402 In fact, of all the female legislators in office during 
this period, 31 percent sponsored at least one women’s interest bill.403 Among male 
legislators, the figure was just five percent.404 Female legislators were also much more 
likely to sponsor bills coded by researchers as feminist, as opposed to simply women’s 
interest.405 This tendency was true across political parties; Piscopo found that a female 
legislator of the conservative PAN was still more likely to introduce a feminist bill than a 
male legislator from the leftist PRD.406 However, throughout the 1997-2009 period, 
women’s interest bills remained a small portion of total bills introduced, increasing from 
nearly five percent to just under seven percent by 2009.407 This study shows that female 
legislators work to represent women’s interests, that increased representation is correlated 
with higher proportions of women’s interest bills, and that women are more likely than 
men to sponsor feminist legislation.  
 Vidal-Correa’s study of women’s interest bills from 2015-2019 focuses on the 
first year of the two legislative periods during this time frame, 2015 and 2018.408 This 
study also found an increase in the proportion of bills that represented women’s interests, 
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from seven percent to 11 percent.409 Female legislators during this period also sponsored 
the majority of women’s interest bills – 67 percent in 2015 and 80 percent in 2018.410 
Vidal-Correa’s study delved further into the content of women’s interest bills than 
Piscopo’s work, revealing that in the 2015-2019 period such bills demonstrated 
meaningful and responsive policy work. The most commonly addressed issues in 
women’s interest bills were violence, gender quotas, and employment.411 While most 
bills continued to conceptualize women as mothers and caretakers – for example most of 
the employment bills focused on maternity leave, child care, and access to breastfeeding 
facilities – there was also a clear commitment to the increased representation of women 
in nontraditional roles.412 Gender quota bills were sponsored for the Supreme Court and 
the police force, while other proposed legislation aimed to promote women in the 
military.413 Bills on violence against women were similarly significant, covering the 
gamut from the characterization of violence, to punishment, to prevention programs, to 
care for victims.414 These results suggest that female legislators do seek to represent 
women’s interests, but not always feminist interests. Further, women’s interest 
legislation, although increasing with the descriptive representation of women, remains a 
small portion of total bills and is not a central focus for most legislators. Vidal-Correa’s 
conclusion eloquently explains the progress made in the substantive representation of 
women in Mexico and the work that remains to be done.  
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“Yes, women legislators seem to be more likely than men to sponsor WI [Women’s Interest] bills, 
but the work of all legislators is yet to embrace identity politics. Furthermore, the connection 
between descriptive and substantive representation exists. However, it is not isolated from the 
political context and from the beliefs and ideologies of the legislators. Perhaps the best way to 
guarantee substantive representation that truly targets women´s issues is by defining this concept 
through a collective process. If this is the case, legislators need to work hand in hand with 
women´s agencies and committees as well as any other organisations capable of articulating 
interests. This does not imply that women legislators are not addressing women´s interests. As the 
data show, women legislators, until very recently, were mostly the ones pushing the issues on the 
agenda. By working with other actors, individuals, or organisations, and maybe becoming more 
experienced, legislators will achieve a process that recognises the significance of articulating 
interests, and with this, better represent all types of women, of all identities.”415 
 
 While female legislators in Mexico have many of the tools necessary to represent 
women’s interests, these interests remain relatively narrow and bills are focused on topics 
where consensus-building is easily achievable. The will of female legislators to act on 
behalf of the women they represent is just the first step in achieving representation. The 
numerical increases in female legislators have made it possible for women to express this 
will through bill introduction and to pass legislation on some issues, but true substantive 
representation ultimately requires that women’s interests be promoted in their full breadth 
and depth. This has yet to be achieved in Mexico. Further, while it is encouraging that 
female legislators are so willing to sponsor women’s interest legislation, the continued 
scarcity of male legislators doing the same suggests that critical mass has not engendered 
a broader shift in political culture or attitudes about women. This is not to say that 
substantive representation has failed in Mexico. As later portions of this paper will show, 
in relative terms substantive representation has actually been successful. The total amount 
of time that there has been a critical mass of women in the legislature is just 10 years. 
While critical mass theory suggests a rapid increase in substantive representation, it may 
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simply be the case that this process is more gradual than the theory argues. Whether this 
slower rate of change is the result of nearly universal factors or contextual ones specific 
to some countries is unclear. However, strictly defined party ideologies and high level of 





 Argentina is just five places below Mexico in the World Economic Forum’s 
Global Gender Gap Index, ranked 30th while Mexico is 25th.416 With an overall score of 
0.746, the gender gaps in the two countries are roughly equal.417 However, country 
performance on specific variables is actually quite different. While Mexico and Argentina 
receive similar scores for educational attainment and health, their political empowerment 
scores vary considerably. Mexico received a 0.468 score for political empowerment in 
2020, while Argentina’s was much lower at 0.387.418 The difference is due to the larger 
portion of women in the Mexican legislature and the significantly smaller percentage of 
women in ministerial positions (42 percent in Mexico and 25 percent in Argentina).419 By 
contrast, Argentina’s economic participation score was slightly higher than Mexico’s, 
largely due to higher female labor force participation in the former.420 Further, the 
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amount of progress made by Argentina since the first publication of the Global Gender 
Gap in 2006 has been much less than that made by Mexico. In the years since 2006, 
Argentina has moved up just nine spots (from 41st to 30th), while Mexico has progressed 
by 50 positions (from 75th to 25th).421 Argentina, of course, began the period of 
measurement with a higher level of gender equality than Mexico, and the main difference 
between their ranks is due to the fact that the Argentine legislature has yet to achieve 
gender parity. These results suggest that overall gender equality is similar in Argentina 
and Mexico, with the primary gains for the latter made in terms of descriptive 
representation. There is no indication from these statistics of a significant difference in 
levels of substantive representation between the two case studies, but, as the remainder of 
this chapter will demonstrate, such differences are both prevalent and significant.  
 Beginning with the legislative venues for women’s substantive representation, it 
is apparent that female legislators in Argentina do not have the same formal tools for 
collective action as their counterparts in Mexico. Unlike in Mexico, there is no bicameral 
institution for female legislators or women’s interests.422 In the Chamber of Deputies, 
there is the Family, Women, Childhood, and Adolescence (CFMNA) committee, which is 
open to both male and female legislators.423 The Senate has had a Women’s Bench since 
2008, which operates much like a Women’s Caucus.424 While the CFMNA and the 
Women’s Bench both have review powers, neither has bill introduction powers.425 This 
 
421 Hausmann, Tyson, and Zahidi, “The Global Gender Gap Report 2006,” 9.  
422 Piscopo, “Inclusive Institutions versus Feminist Advocacy: Women’s Legislative Committees and 
Caucuses in Latin America,” 4.  
423 Ibid.  
424 Ibid.  
425 Ibid.  
 92 
is, however, typical of legislative committees in Argentina.426 Thus, the CIG has more 
legislative weight than either the CFMNA or the Women’s Bench. The policy remits of 
these institutions are also distinct. The CIG and Women’s Bench are both women/gender 
quality focused in name and in policy scope, and membership in both is restricted to 
female legislators.427 The CFMNA is quite different in that women are just a small 
portion of the broader policy remit and there is no specific focus on gender quality. 
Indeed, the CFMNA reflects a global tendency to lump women and children together, as 
‘women-and-children,’ rather to view women’s issues and domestic issues as largely 
separate areas that both benefit from gendered perspective policy making. Neither the 
CFMNA nor the Women’s Bench truly serve as a focal point for collective action as the 
CIG does in Mexico.428  
 While the broader policy area of the CFMNA and the inclusion of male legislators 
in its membership are limiting factors, the similar legislative behavior of the Women’s 
Bench – where neither of these issues are apparent – highlights the deeper struggles of 
substantive representation in Argentina. Piscopo’s interviews with female legislators in 
Argentina reveal that despite the high proportion of women, many continue to fear being 
perceived as exclusively or overly interested in the representation of women’s 
interests.429 The prevalence of this attitude alone presents a compelling argument that 
substantive representation in Argentina is lacking, considering that one of the central 
arguments of critical mass theory is that achieving critical mass allows women to move 
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beyond the role entrapment and isolation effects that prevent them from acting as 
representatives for other women.430  
 Another challenge to substantive representation in Argentina is the lack of focus 
on consensus-building among female legislators. Rather, there is a tendency to operate in 
temporary and informal coalitions to sponsor and promote women’s interest 
legislation.431 This can be viewed as part of the larger pattern of women’s mobilization in 
Argentina that goes back to the introduction of the gender quota and is the result of 
perspectives about the role of gender in politics that are fundamentally different from 
those held by women in Mexico. Efforts to pass the gender quota for example, were not 
generally part of a broader women’s movement but included women from many different 
views that agreed almost solely on the quota.432 By contrast, the gender quota movement 
in Mexico was part of a larger push for more democratic and inclusive governance that 
emphasized gender equality as means of achieving improved governance.433 
Additionally, the political networks established by quota advocates in Mexico did not 
disappear when the quota law was passed, instead they remained institutionalized both 
formally and informally as part of the Mexican political system. In Argentina, the 
Network of Feminist Politicians – established in 1990 to mobilize for the quota law – 
almost immediately disintegrated after the law was passed.434 Instead of continuing to 
build consensus for women’s issues, “members redirected their political action towards 
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the interior of their parties in order to guarantee compliance with the Law and to position 
themselves within the internal party competition for the spaces that had been opened up 
by the quota system.”435 The coalitions supporting the Mexican gender quota advocated 
for a number of other reforms and were dedicated to creating lasting soft infrastructure 
for women’s collective action in government.436 Whereas women’s interest legislation, 
lobbying, and activism in Mexico still place a heavy emphasis on gender mainstreaming 
and brining a gendered perspective to all aspects of government, this issue has received 
considerably less attention in Argentina.437  
 The lack of consensus-building and unity in women’s organizations in the 
legislature prevent female legislators from acting as a bloc to achieve broader goals such 
as gender mainstreaming. However, the emphasis on temporary coalitions that often 
involve outside groups and individuals allows female legislators to rally support for 
causes that are difficult to address in Mexico, such as reproductive rights.438 Thus, 
legislators have achieved substantive representation in the sense that they have been able 
to create targeted change on a variety of issues, and have passed significant feminist 
legislation in addition to women’s interest legislation, but have not succeeded in some of 
the wide ranging reforms that women in Mexico have passed. Abortion laws illustrate 
this difference well. In December 2020, federal legislators voted to legalize elective 
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abortions for up to 14 weeks of a pregnancy.439 In doing so, Argentina became only the 
fourth country in all of Latin America to legalize elective abortions – termination for a 
reason other than threat to the mother’s life or rape – after Cuba, Guyana, and 
Uruguay.440 Such legislation has been impossible at the federal level in Mexico, largely 
because women’s issues are tackled through the CIG, the CIG relies on consensus, and 
there is no consensus on abortion in Mexico, nor in many other Latin American 
countries.441 Thus, the types of substantive representation in Argentina are different from 
that of Mexico, but it would be difficult to argue that one country has a higher degree of 
substantive representation than the other simply because of these differences.  
 Examining legislative behavior among female Deputies, a number of studies show 
that women do represent women’s interests in Argentina. Unfortunately, no studies 
covering any period of time after 2007 were located. However, women reached critical 
mass in 2002 and their representation increased to 40 percent by 2007, so this still allows 
for five years of study during which female legislators were 30 percent or more of the 
total.442 Htun, Lacalle, and Micozzi conducted a study of all of the bills introduced in 
Argentina between 1983 and 2007 with a focus on women’s interest legislation.443 They 
included 172,130 bills in the study, of which 3,272 bill (1.8 percent) were coded as 
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women’s interest.444 The study found that the correlation between increased 
representation of women and the number of women’s interest bills introduced was 
positive and highly significant and that the number of women’s interest bills increased at 
a greater rate than the overall increase in bills.445 Membership in the CFMNA or 
Women’s Bench was also positively correlated with sponsorship of women’s interest 
legislation.446 
 Moreover, this study found that the increased presence of female legislators 
influences male bill introduction behavior. With more women in both chambers, male 
Deputies and Senators sponsored more women’s interest legislation.447 This last result is, 
thus far, the only distinction from studies of legislative behavior in Mexico, which found 
that women’s presence did not significantly alter introduction of women’s interest bills 
by men.448 Using predictive statistics based on the bill sponsorship data, the study found 
that if there are no women in the legislature, individual male Deputies are likely to author 
0.5 women’s interest bills per year whereas the lone female Deputy would be likely to 
write two women’s interest bill.449 With 30 percent female legislators, each male Deputy 
is predicted to sponsor one women’s interest bill each year and each female Deputy is 
predicted to sponsor three women’s interests bills.450 Although these results are 
predictive, they do reflect the observed trends in women’s interest legislation and its 
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sponsors in Argentina. Even if the effects on real individual male Deputies are smaller 
than the authors suggest, for example if the increases are driven by several prolific male 
Deputies and not a general increase, the endurance and consistency of this trend over 
time suggests that shifts in political culture have occurred in Argentina as a result of 
women’s higher descriptive representation.  
 Johnson and Archenti’s study of 1994-2003 reinforces this theory.451 Their study 
found that during this period, the percentage of committees in the Chamber of Deputies 
with a female President or Vice-President increased substantially. The proportion of 
female committee Presidents increased by 23 percentage points and the increase for 
female Vice-Presidents was 11 percentage points, so that by 2003, 30 percent of 
committees had a female President and 24 percent had a woman as Vice-President.452 
This suggests that women in the Chamber of Deputies were very quickly able to gain 
access to key leadership and decision-making positions as their descriptive representation 
increased. Significantly, this effect has not been limited to legislative seats. While women 
continue to be underrepresented in the executive branch, over the past 10 years they have 
accounted for 20 to 25 percent of executive cabinet seats – a marked increase from the 
zero women in executive cabinets between 1983 and 1995.453 Taken together, these 
results show some evidence for both a shift in political climate as it relates to gender and 
for the role model effect. However, it should be noted that the gender distribution of 
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committee assignments still favors men for more prestigious committees.454 Women are 
overrepresented in committees related to women, family, children, and social issues.455 
Similarly, they are underrepresented on budgetary and economic committees that have 
more political weight and are generally held in higher esteem.456  
 Johnson and Archenti’s study also looked at the primary issues tackled in 
women’s interest legislation, finding that most bills were related to marriage and 
maternity (35 percent), some dealt with violence against women (11 percent) and 
political rights (8 percent), and relatively few with more controversial issues such as 
reproductive rights.457 However, feminist legislation in Argentina has a better track 
record than in Mexico, as the country has passed progressive laws on contraception, 
sexual education, and abortion that have often been ahead of the curve in Latin 
America.458 While the majority of women’s interest legislation introduced in Argentina is 
not necessarily feminist legislation, some of it is and some of it has been highly 
successful.  
 Female legislators have the resources to promote substantive representation in 
Argentina. The tools and methods that they employ, while often different from their 
counterparts in Mexico, have the potential for success. While not all female legislators 
work on women’s interest legislation and some do not want to be associated with it, many 
women actively promote a variety of causes, including ones that could be called 
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progressive or feminist. Most importantly, there is significant evidence that substantive 
representation has increased on a number of levels as descriptive representation has risen. 
That there is a clear link between the two supports some aspects of critical mass theory, 
but the differences in the types of representation seen in Argentina and Mexico show that 
the presence of women in legislatures is not the sole factor in substantive representation. 
Indeed, the continued collaboration and activism of female legislators and civil society 
networks has been critical in ensuring increased substantive representation despite 
institutional challenges. In different ways, this organizing can be traced back to the 
gender quota movement in each country. Mobilization in support of the gender quota in 
Argentina was not driven by consensus and party divides among female legislators were 
apparent. The coalitions established for the quota were also not long-lasting, but they 
established a pattern of single-issue collaboration within the legislature and with civil 
society that has enabled Argentina to achieve a high degree of substantive representation, 
especially on feminist issues. Cross-party and civil society women’s networks in Mexico 
were born out of the gender quota movement and have lasted to this day, held together 
through consensus norms. This has engendered a high degree of substantive 
representation in Mexico in regards to broader women’s interests and gender 




Substantive Representation Below Critical Mass: Brazil and Chile 
 
 This chapter will examine the two case studies in which female legislators have 
not reached critical mass: Brazil and Chile. Using similar methods to Chapter Four, the 
extent of substantive representation will be evaluated. In doing so, this chapter will 
analyze the tools that female legislators have available to them in order to affect 
substantive representation, their involvement in women’s interest legislation, and their 
effectiveness in promoting women’s interests. Chapter Five will, however, pay greater 
attention to outcomes than was demonstrated in Chapter Four. In Argentina and Mexico, 
the achievement of critical mass means that the central investigative focus must be on 
how critical mass has translated to substantive representation. In the available literature, 
this is assessed primarily through the behavior of female legislators and sometimes male 
legislators. In the absence of a critical mass of female legislators, it is necessary to not 
only examine the behavior of existing female legislators, but also to compare and contrast 
the gender equality outcomes that have been achieved in the case studies. In other words, 
this chapter asks whether a high degree of substantive representation is possible without 









 Brazil is ranked 92nd in the Global Gender Gap report, and received 0.691 as its 
most recent score.459 These values place Brazil well below Argentina and Mexico in 
terms of gender equality, but this difference is derived almost entirely from the political 
empowerment category. Brazil performs better than Argentina and Mexico in economic 
participation and equally as well in education and health.460 Indeed, all that separates 
Brazil’s 92nd position from Mexico’s 25th place are the discrepancies in the percentage of 
women in the Congress and in ministerial positions.461 These results provide an initial 
suggestion that despite low descriptive representative, Brazil has been able to achieve 
important gender equality outcomes, hallmarks of successful substantive representation.  
 Women currently comprise approximately 15 percent of the Brazilian 
legislature.462 However, Brazil has had a large, highly active, and diverse feminist 
movement since the 1980s.463 Activist networks are complex and enormous and reach the 
highest levels of decision-making in the country. One of the most impressive strengths of 
substantive representation in Brazil is the high degree of organization and coordination in 
and between women’s groups in the legislature and in civil society.464 Like Argentina and 
Mexico, Brazil has organizations for women’s issues in the legislature. There is no bi-
cameral organization; however, the Chamber of Deputies has the Women’s Caucus and 
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the Senate has the Women’s Bench. The Women’s Secretariat was founded in 2013 to 
combine the previously existing women’s bench, often called Bancada do Batom or 
Lipstick Lobby,465 and the Women’s Prosecutor’s Office, created in 2009.466 Although 
the Women’s Secretariat occasionally deals with issues relating to family and children, its 
primary mandate is women’s issues and its historical roots are in the Brazilian feminist 
movement.467 Despite lacking some of the powers that women’s legislative groups 
possess in Argentina and Mexico, the Women’s Secretariat has made impressive gains.  
 The formal powers of the Women’s Secretariat include legislative monitoring, 
and receiving and providing legal advice on complaints related to sexual and domestic 
violence.468 Critically, the organization serves as a kind of clearinghouse for women’s 
issues at the federal level and works closely with the National Council of Women’s 
Rights and the Special National Secretariat for Women’s Policies, a ministerial body.469 
The collaboration between female legislators who, at the time, did not have a women’s 
caucus and the National Council of Women’s Rights was crucial for the progressive 
achievements of Brazil’s 1988 Constitution.470 Such achievements included enumerating 
the equality of men and women under the law, obligating the state to prevent domestic 
violence, and mandating 120 days of paid maternity leave.471 
 Perhaps most importantly, the Women’s Secretariat is closely involved with a 
number of non-governmental women’s organizations, including the Center for Feminist 
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Studies and Advisory Services, which was founded in 1988 to assist lawmakers in 
drafting and passing progressive women’s interest legislation.472 Furthermore, although 
these coalitions change as civil society organizations grow, decline, or shift, the overall 
pattern of collaboration is enduring. The Women’s Secretariat has worked closely with 
the Center for Feminist Studies since the 1980s and continues to do so today.473 In the 
Senate, the Women’s Bench, founded in 1998, operates very similarly.474 It works on 
projects relating to women’s health, employment, and involvement in politics in addition 
to prevention of violence against women and housing a Special Prosecutor’s Office for 
Women.475 The functions and methods of the women’s legislative organizations are thus 
distinct from those in Argentina and Mexico. In Brazil, female legislators pursue feminist 
legislation that would push the boundaries of what is acceptable in Mexico’s CIG.476 
Furthermore, while legislators in Argentina are advocating similarly progressive policies, 
they do so in ad-hoc coalitions that do not resemble the strong network of advocacy 
present in Brazil. Women in the Brazilian Congress have a plethora of formal and 
informal tools available to them to advance women’s representation and equality and 
many are willing to use them.477 To characterize the general nature of women’s 
organization within the Brazilian Congress, it falls somewhere between the overly 
consensus-driven system in Mexico and the temporary and insecure networks of 
organization in Argentina.  
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 Having established that many of the tools needed for substantive representation 
through collaboration do indeed exist and function well in Brazil, the next piece to 
analyze is legislative behavior. One important distinction between Argentina and Mexico 
in Chapter Four and Brazil and Chile in this chapter is the closed list versus open list 
voting system. Scholars have suggested that closed list systems are predicated on voter 
support for party platforms and not as much on the experience, past performance, and 
policies of individual candidates.478 In an open list system, where voters can rank their 
candidate choices, candidates may feel a greater need to target specific constituencies and 
to act in office in ways that attract these constituencies. Essentially, legislators, once in 
office, may feel a pressure to work towards the specific needs of their constituents rather 
than simply toeing the party line. In this sense, one might expect female legislators in 
open list systems to be more actively committed to women’s issues in office, if women 
are a key constituency, than female legislators in closed list systems.479 Unfortunately, 
similar data on bill sponsorship and introduction as those presented in the previous 
chapter were not located for Brazil. This is likely because the majority of bills that pass in 
Brazil, approximately 75 percent, originate from the executive branch.480 However, data 
concerning the prominence of female legislators, the prevalence of women in appointed 
positions, discourses in the Chamber of Deputies, and survey responses are available to 
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assist in determining whether and how female legislators represent women and what 
barriers are present.  
 Female legislators in Brazil possess less political clout, occupy fewer leadership 
positions, and are less likely to be involved in ‘hard politics’ than their male counterparts. 
In Brazil’s case, the Interunion Department of Parliamentary Aides provides useful data 
on the political power of legislators.481 Each year, a list is compiled of the “Best 100 
Heads in National Congress,” based on legislator’s formal positions, decision-making 
power, and reputation with others.482 One analysis of this list found that between 1994 
and 2009, the number of women considered among the top 100 most influential members 
of Congress never rose beyond six and averaged just under five.483 In other words, among 
the most powerful members of the Brazilian Congress, typically just five percent of them 
are women. This underrepresentation is due to a number of factors; dismissals of 
women’s lack of influence as the result of inexperience are not fully accurate. Indeed, one 
of the main issues explaining the lower political standing of many female legislators is 
their formal relegation to ‘soft’ committees and informal expectation to focus on social 
issues rather than high prestige projects with high economic and political impact.484 An 
analysis of 1999 to 2006 found that 86 percent of women served on ‘soft’ committees 
while just 55 percent of men did the same.485 In high prestige committees, 75 percent of 
men participated compared to 47 percent of women.486 The same is true of ministerial 
 
481 Louis F. Miguel, “Policy Priorities and Women’s Double Bind in Brazil,” in The Impact of Gender 
Quotas (Oxford University Press, 2012), 104.  
482 Ibid.  
483 Ibid.  
484 Ibid, 116.  
485 Ibid, 109.  
486 Ibid.  
 106 
positions, where women are extremely underrepresented, especially in high status 
ministries.487 The current Brazilian cabinet is just nine percent women, which is not an 
uncommonly low number for the country.488  Even under a female President, Dilma 
Roussef, women held just two of the ten ministerial posts considered to be politically and 
economically important.489  
 These results suggest two things. First, female legislators in Brazil have not 
escaped the tokenization and role entrapment observed by Kanter in the absence of 
critical mass.490 Female legislators are pressured to focus on social issues, of which 
women’s interests are a large part, but work on these issues is considered less important 
than other legislative priorities and prevents women from accumulating political clout.491 
This creates a cycle in which female legislators work hard to promote women’s issues 
but, partially as a result of that work, are unable to move up the proverbial legislative 
ladder and gain the power that might facilitate broader and deeper policy change for 
women. However, these results are not substantively different from what has been 
observed in Argentina and Mexico. Although in those countries women have made more 
progress in accessing leadership and cabinet positions, including those on traditionally 
‘masculine’ topics, this has only occurred very recently. Second, the continued low 
presence of women in ministry and cabinet posts, as well as in the judicial branch, 
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demonstrates that there has not been a role-model effect in Brazil as a result of the quota. 
This, too, is largely consistent with findings from Argentina and Mexico which, while 
slightly more encouraging, generally do not support the existence of a role-model effect.  
 In terms of data on bills, the available results do not speak specifically to 
women’s interest legislation, but rather to the overall success of female legislators. 
Estimates place the passage rate of bills introduced by female legislators between 1.5 
percent and 4.5 percent, compared to five to seven percent for both genders.492 
Furthermore, 19 percent of the bills passed by women in the study were for largely 
superficial projects, such as naming institutions or creating commemorative dates.493 For 
both genders, this figure was just 3.8 percent.494 These statistics demonstrate that female 
legislators have more difficulty passing legislation and that when they do pass legislation 
it is much more likely to relatively unimportant. In a broader sense, this shows that 
female legislators face additional barriers in law-making compared to their male 
counterparts. This provides evidence of persistent discrimination within the Congress and 
suggests a major impediment for the substantive representation of women.  
 In the absence of data on women’s interest bill sponsorship and introduction, 
another way of examining legislators’ commitment to women’s interests is through 
speeches and parliamentary discussion. In plenary debates, issues of ‘hard politics’ are 
the central focus, reinforcing their primacy in the Congress in general.495 Male legislators 
are more likely to speak on these issues, a difference of six percentage points.496 
 
492 Miguel, “Policy Priorities and Women’s Double Bind in Brazil,” 116. 
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495 Ibid, 111-13.  
496 Ibid.  
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However, women are more 16 percentage points likely to discuss ‘soft politics,’ which 
nearly evens the total number of speeches given by each gender.497 Incumbency may 
contribute to this disparity. The same study found a steep decline in the number of 
speeches on ‘soft politics’ from first term legislators to third term legislators.498 Turning 
to content about women’s issues, female legislators are nearly twice as likely to discuss 
abortion than their male colleagues, although the topic is not heavily discussed due to 
stigma.499 Analysis of the speeches made on International Women’s Day between 1975 
and 2006 provide some further insight. Women were also twice as likely to speak about 
women and women’s issues on this day compared to men.500 Female legislators also used 
the occasion to raise legitimate policy issues relating to women much more frequently 
than their male counterparts.501 While the majority of speeches given by male legislators 
were ritual, depoliticized, or historical in nature, 86 percent of speeches made by female 
legislators made real critiques of gender issues or were focused on serious policy 
changes.502 While narrow in scope, these statistics do provide some evidence that female 
legislators in Brazil are concerned with women’s issues and that this concern is both 
more frequent and more substantive than that generally demonstrated by male colleagues. 
This is consistent with research from Argentina and Mexico showing that female 
legislators are, on average, more willing to represent women’s interests than their male 
counterparts.  
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 Data from the Center for Feminist Studies and Advisory Services (CFEMEA) 
provides more recent information about the policy perspectives of male and female 
legislators in regards to women’s rights.503 The 2019 version of the CFEMEA’s report on 
Women’s Resistance in the National Congress notes that of the 77 women in the 
Congress, 20 identify openly as feminists.504 CFEMEA’s data also sheds light on the 
success of collaborations between female legislators and non-governmental organizations 
in Brazil. In 2019 alone, CFEMEA monitored 230 proposals for bills pertaining to 
women’s rights and access to services.505 In the same year, 75 of these bills were 
presented in the Chamber of Deputies.506 The report remarks that this is a marked 
increase from previous years; however, many of the bills, especially those concerning 
reproductive rights and abortion, sought to, from a feminist perspective, restrict women’s 
rights.507 Thus, women’s issues are being deliberated and addressed extensively in the 
Brazilian Congress, but not always in keeping with Western feminist orthodoxy.   
 A survey conducted by CFEMEA between 2007 and 2010 gathered results about 
views on women’s issues from 321 legislators.508 Eight percent of respondents were 
women and 92 percent were men.509 The majority of the respondents were from the 
center or center-left, 62 percent for men and 45 percent for women.510 Another 41 percent 
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of women were from the left. The low percentage of respondents from the right (nine 
percent for men and eight percent for women) certainly skews the results, but the data is 
still useful for evaluating the difference in viewpoints between male and female 
legislators. Selected results from the report, translated using Google Translate, are 
summarized in a table below.  
Table 1: Brazilian Legislator Survey Results: Women’s Rights 2007-2010511  
Statement/Policy Position Both 
Genders 
Women Men  
Political parties should be 
punished for non-compliance 
with the gender quota 
Agree or somewhat agree 37 85 32 
Disagree or somewhat 
disagree 
62 15 67 
Placement mandates should 
be implemented for candidate 
lists  
Agree or somewhat agree 25 67 21 
Disagree or somewhat 
disagree 
73 33 76 
Parties should devote 30% of 
candidate funds to female 
candidates 
Agree or somewhat agree 64 89 61 
Disagree or somewhat 
disagree 
35 7 37 
Regulated 1 month paternity 
leave  
Agree or somewhat agree 39 - - 
Disagree or somewhat 
disagree 
59 - - 
Extend maternity leave to 6 
months  
Agree or somewhat agree 51 - - 
Disagree or somewhat 
disagree 
46 - - 
Allow abortion if serious risk 
to mother’s health  
Agree or somewhat agree 89 - - 
Disagree or somewhat 
disagree 
9 - - 
Allow abortion at 12 weeks 
(no other conditions)  
Agree or somewhat agree 23 - - 
Disagree or somewhat 
disagree 
72 - - 
Allow abortion at 20 weeks 
in cases of rape  
Agree or somewhat agree 61 - - 
Disagree or somewhat 
disagree 
35 - - 
*Non-responses and ‘Do not know’ responses are not included in this table.  
**Gender disaggregated data is presented as given in the cited report. Some questions did not report gender 
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 There are several key takeaways from the data presented in Table 1. The 
responses to questions about the gender quota demonstrate a concerning lack of support 
for the quota law in among men. In particular, the limited agreement among men for 
punishments for non-compliance and enforcement of placement mandates suggests that 
male legislators would prefer the quota be loose and, perhaps, ineffectual. Given the low 
proportion of women in the legislature even after the quota, this implies that many male 
legislators prefer or are satisfied with the underrepresentation of women. The opposition 
from male legislators to increased descriptive representation for women has several 
important implications for substantive representation. It suggests that male legislators do 
not understand the importance of female representation or are unwilling to sacrifice 
candidate spots in order to increase women’s presence in the legislature. This bodes 
poorly for women eventually reaching critical mass in Brazil. If part of their reluctance to 
support effective quota measures comes from gender bias or a lack of value placed of 
women’s issues, this indicates significant barriers for female legislators in enacting 
substantive representation without critical mass. Further, it may suggest that the 
opposition from male legislators goes deeper than placement mandates and enforcement 
mechanisms; some men may reject the quota entirely. This perspective would seriously 
jeopardize opportunities for female legislators to represent women in office or, for that 
matter, to represent anyone effectively if their male counterparts believe they have gained 
their position ‘illegitimately,’ 
 Unfortunately, gender disaggregated results were not available for the questions 
on abortion and parental leave. However, because 92 percent of the respondents were 
men the data provides considerable insight about the perspective of male legislators even 
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without disaggregation.512 The relatively high support for extended maternal leave 
suggests that legislators in general, and men in particular, do consider women’s labor 
rights important. The support for paternal leave seems to imply that legislators 
understand the relevance of gendered division of domestic labor, even if they do not 
directly consider paternal leave a women’s rights issue. Responses to the questions on 
abortion mostly reflect satisfaction with the current laws on abortion, as well as the 
continued public sentiment against legalized abortion without extenuating circumstances. 
This data demonstrates limited progress on some women’s issues, divisions between male 
and female legislators in regards to women’s political representation, and continued 
resistance to some feminist policies.  
 Ultimately, the perspectives reflected in Table 1 suggest that female legislators 
face significant barriers in enacting effective substantive representation and that their 
presence has not engendered a broader cultural shift in the legislature. The efficacy of the 
Women’s Secretariat and the deep and persistent collaboration between female legislators 
and civil society actors in encouraging.513 Furthermore, outcomes for women in health, 
education, and especially employment in Brazil demonstrate that gender equality is being 
addressed on a number of fronts even with the low proportion of women in the 
legislature.514 However, much of this progress has been due to the tireless efforts of civil 
society organizations and public movements.515 Female legislators in Brazil struggle to 
 
512 Dultra et al., Como parlamentares pensam os direitos das mulheres? Pesquisa na legislatura 2007 - 
2010 do congresso nacional, 13.  
513 Htun, “Puzzles of Women’s Rights in Brazil,” 736. 
514 “Global Gender Gap 2020: Data Explorer,” World Economic Forum. 
515 Arújo, Calasanti, and Htun, “Women, Power, and Policy in Brazil,” 223-25.  
 113 
attain political clout and prestige and face gender bias within the legislature.516 Many of 
these problems reflect those apparent in Argentina and Mexico, yet more progress has 




 In 2020, Chile ranked 57th in the Global Gender Gap Report, scoring an overall 
total of 0.723.517 This score places Chile just slightly below Argentina, which scored 
0.746.518 The difference in their scores comes almost entirely from the political 
empowerment category. Chile, Argentina, and Mexico rank roughly the same in the three 
other categories.519 Observing the pattern with all four case studies, it seems that in many 
measurable outcomes of gender equality there is little substantive difference other than 
the proportion of women in government. Data on bill introduction and voting behavior on 
women’s interests bills in the legislature was not located for this case study. The recent 
introduction of the gender quota limits the overall amount of available literature on this 
topic and the ‘presidentialist’ nature of legislation in Chile would challenge the 
usefulness of this data if it was available. Instead, this section devotes greater attention to 
the relationships between formal and informal institutions and norms and substantive 
representation.  
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 Chile is an intriguing case study of women’s substantive representation. The 
gender quota has only been in place a few short years and the proportion of women 
remains below critical mass at 22.6 percent.520 Much of the progress the country has 
made on women’s issues took place under the two terms of a female President, Michelle 
Bachelet from 2006 to 2010 and from 2015 to 2018. Furthermore, Chile has several 
distinct formal and informal facets of governance that influence both the descriptive and 
substantive representation. The country is often characterized as ‘presidentialist,’ 
meaning that a great deal of power, including legislative power, rests within the 
Executive Branch.521 Despite this, governance is often informally regulating by 
consensus norms.522 This is rooted partially in the fact that politics is dominated by 
coalitions rather than one or two parties at a time, as in Argentina.523 However, although 
parties typically must form coalitions to govern, they are each stable and ideologically 
well-defined, as in Mexico.524 This creates a system in which the President has 
considerable legislative power, but often prioritizes consensus in policy-making in a 
political system dominated by coalitions of strong and well-defined political parties. 
Among these parties, the socially conservative Christian Democrats typically features in 
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the ruling coalition.525 These characteristics of governance in Chile present numerous 
potential implications for the substantive representation of women.  
 The legislative power of the Executive, which is similar in many ways to 
Brazil,526 means that women’s interest legislation is, like nearly all other legislation, 
largely dependent on Presidential support.527 Thus, the political party, identity, and values 
of each President greatly affect the progress, or stalling, of women’s rights and gender 
equality. This can work both for and against substantive representation in terms of gender 
equality outcomes through legislation, but the larger influence of the Executive Branch 
necessarily means that less power rests in the legislature and, thus, female legislators 
have less power with which to enact substantive representation. In Chile as in Mexico, 
consensus norms are important. However, these norms apply to governance in general in 
Chile, as opposed to specifically to women’s organizations in Mexico.528 Additionally, 
the presence of strong, socially conservative parties is not limited to the right in Chile. 
The Christian Democrats are often a leading force in center and center-left coalitions, 
meaning that political opposition to some feminist policies is common among right, 
center-right, center, and center-left governments.529 This is not unique in Latin America, 
but the prominence of the Christian Democrats due to the party’s leading role in steering 
the country into democratization does lend the party a special place in Chilean politics.530   
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 Chile has the weakest formal organization of female legislators of the four case 
studies. While the Senate has no organization of any kind, the Chamber of Deputies does 
have a Women’s Caucus.531 However, the Women’s Caucus is informal, meaning that it 
does not have any official powers and there are no formal rules governing the body.532 
The Women’s Caucus further lacks both a communication plan and a strategic plan.533 
The organization’s main focus is gender equality, rather than something more broad such 
as women, children, and family. It is open to male and female legislators of all parties.534 
However, despite the informality of the Women’s Caucus, the Chamber of Deputies does 
have a formal Commission on Women and Gender Equality.535 This Commission has 16 
members, all women, and authors a handful of bills and reports each year.536 Notably, it 
has sponsored a number of feminist bills in the last five years. In 2018, the Commission 
authored an unsuccessful bill to decriminalize abortion without conditions until 14 
weeks.537 The bill was revived this year, around the same time that Argentina legalized 
abortion, and will be voted on in April.538 In the same year, the Commission introduced a 
bill requiring political parties to implement protocols for the prevention and punishment 
of sexual harassment.539 In 2021, the organization authored a bill that would provide 
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protection and reparations to the families of femicide victims.540 The Commission on 
Women and Gender Equality is smaller and has less formal power than the CIG in 
Mexico, for example. Although the body does not produce a large quantity of legislation, 
it is clearly willing to sponsor progressive, feminist bills. However, opportunities for 
substantive women’s collaboration within the legislature are limited.  
 Chile has in recent years created a number of other governmental bodies outside 
the legislature that deal with women’s interests, some of which are prominent and well-
funded. Immediately after the democratic transition in 1990, the government created a 
women’s policy agency called Servicio Nacional de la Mujer (SERNAM).541 The 
creation of SERNAM was tied to the activism of a group called the Coalition of Women 
for Democracy, and quickly resulted in the establishment of a highly successful national 
Plan for Equal Opportunity of Women.542 This echoed the establishment of important 
women’s organizations in government that took place in Argentina and Mexico; this 
repetitive narrative reinforces the primacy of women’s activism in achieving substantive 
change. In 2015, SERNAM was upgraded to a Ministry for Women, which enjoys a great 
deal of funding, resources, and policy influence.543 The work of these organizations, with 
considerable support from President Bachelet in her second term, has resulted in a 
number of progressive, feminist policies in Chile, including universal day-care for low-
income families, access to contraception for all women and girls 14 and older, and the 
expansion of laws on violence against women and domestic violence.544  
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 However, it is important to note that Chile does not have the same history of 
solidarity among female legislators as Argentina and Mexico. The establishment of the 
quota law in each country is a prime example of this, but the same pattern extends to 
other divisive issues. Whereas women in Mexico were able to overcome strict party 
ideologies to support the quota through organization, collaboration, and consensus and 
women in Argentina were able to form coalitions to push through the quota, female 
legislators in Chile were deeply divided on the quota. In a 2008 survey, just 49 percent of 
women in the coalition on the right, Alianza, expressed support for a gender quota.545 
Htun cites an interview she conducted with a female legislator from Alianza in 2012 to 
explain how partisan divisions among women extend to other issues, summarizing the 
interviewee’s remarks as follows: “whereas they could find common ground on women’s 
access to work and the problem of violence, they would continue to disagree on abortion 
and on quotas.”546 These remarks indicate that female legislators are committed to 
promoting substantive representation on issues where consensus is available, such as 
equality under the law, labor and employment, education, health, and violence against 
women. However, on more divisive issues female legislators do not act as a unified 
group, and this is not the case for just a few hardline Deputies or Senators but for a large 
portion of women. Furthermore, the division seems to be the result of deeply entrenched 
features of party politics rather than the lack of critical mass. The gender quota ultimately 
passed because of the incredible support President Bachelet placed behind it, indicating 
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once more that the executive is often the final arbiter of gender issues, and most other 
issues, in Chile.547   
 When discussing substantive representation in Chile, it is important to recognize 
that while women are not well-represented in the legislature, they have done better in 
appointed positions than their counterparts in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico. Since 1990, 
women have comprised an average of 29 percent of each administration’s initial 
Executive Cabinet; since 2000 this number has been 37 percent.548 Currently, women 
represent 33 percent of the Cabinet.549 This is a marked different to the low presence of 
women in appointed positions in Mexico (until President Loprez Obrador) and Brazil, 
and it is slightly above the representation in Argentina which has typically been 20 to 25 
percent in the past decade.550  
 Franceschet neatly sums up the case of women’s substantive representation in 
Chile by boiling it down to three key facets.551 First, although women have not reached 
critical mass in the Chilean legislature, they are highly active on women’s issues and 
have the support of the influential Ministry for Women (formerly SERNAM) behind 
them.552 Second, consensus-building norms and clearly defined partisan ideology 
influence all policy-making, including on gender issues, and this can both help and hinder 
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women’s interest legislation depending on the specific topic addressed.553 Third, the 
presidentialist nature of the political system means that outcomes on gender issues are 
often ultimately determined by the President and the executive, sometimes regardless of 
the efforts of legislators.554  Chile is thus well-positioned to make great strides on 
women’s issues when supported by the President and to ‘weather the storm’ with 
continued progress on non-controversial issues through the Ministry for Women when 
without executive support.555 Female legislators are largely willing to work on women’s 
interest legislation and do so, in part, through the Commission on Women and Gender 
Equality.556 However, this work is marked by partisan divides. Consensus norms are not 
prioritized within women’s groups, but instead refer to the need for consensus between 
the legislature and the executive. Despite this, the high proportion of women in executive 
cabinets over the last two decades is a highly encouraging sign for women’s substantive 
representation given the enormous influence of the executive.557  
 Taking all of this into account, the degree of substantive representation for 
women in Chile is not high. In comparison to the other case studies, Chile seems to lag 
behind Argentina and Mexico, although each country has areas in which substantive 
representation is stronger and weaker than the other case studies. All three countries are 
ahead of Brazil in both substantive and descriptive representation. The first chapter of 
this paper defined substantive representation as a measure of the position and agency of 
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women within legislative bodies and their power and will to represent women’s interests. 
The vast majority of progress on gender equality in Chile has taken place under a female 
president who has, at times, gone to great lengths to ensure that both feminist and 
women’s interest measures are implemented.558 Female legislators, while making great 
strides on some issues, are often divided and the institutional tools, both formal and 
informal, at their disposal are weak compared to those in the other case studies.559 In 
Chile, as in Argentina, connections between civil society groups and female legislators do 
not feature heavily in legislation on women’s issues.560 However, the general trajectory of 
both descriptive and substantive representation for women has been positive. The 
legislative activity of the Commission on Women and Gender Equality in recent years 
illustrates this point.561 Furthermore, women in the executive, including in the cabinet 
and ministries, are enacting substantive representation in Chile.562 This raises questions 
about placing the locus of research on substantive representation on legislative bodies 
when clearly other parts of government can conduct similar work.  
 In both Brazil and Chile, there were no strong activism networks supporting the 
adoption and implementation of gender quotas. However, civil society organizations are 
important sources of substantive representation in both countries. Indeed, the connections 
between non-governmental institutions and female legislators are crucial in both 
countries for women’s interest issues and legislation. The lack of political clout of female 
 
558 Htun, “Gender Quotas: Why and How,” 63. 
559 Franceschet, “Informal Institutions and Women’s Political Representation in Chile (1990-2015),” 149-
53. 
560 Ibid.  
561 “Comisión de Mujeres y Equidad de Género,” Honorable Cámara de Diputados de Chile.  
562 Tobar, “Feminist Politics in Contemporary Chile: From the Democratic Transition to Bachelet,” 38-39.  
 122 
legislators in both countries and the signs of continued tokenization suggest that lower 
descriptive representation is hindering substantive representation. However, women have 
























 This paper analyzed gender quotas and their descriptive and substantive effects in 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico to answer the question: To what extent and in what 
ways does women’s collaboration influence the relationship between the descriptive and 
substantive representation of women in the context of legislated candidate gender quotas? 
The findings of this paper support the hypothesis. Women’s collaboration within the 
legislature and between the legislature and civil society is a critical and overlooked 
variable in defining the relationship between descriptive and substantive representation. 
Specifically, cross-party collaboration among legislators and with women’s civil society 
groups resulted in more effective articulation of women’s interest and feminist goals. 
Networks of women in civil society and women in the legislature that were founded 
during the gender quota movement and persisted afterwards are associated with higher 
substantive representation. In Mexico and Argentina, patterns of collaboration were 
defined during the movement for gender quotas and have endured to this day. In Brazil 
and Chile, collaboration has been lower and no movement for gender quotas was ever 
active.  
 In Mexico, high descriptive representation has not led to full substantive 
representation, particularly in regards to feminist issues. The same has occurred in 
Argentina, although there feminist issues have received more attention and representation 
of broader women’s interest and gender mainstreaming has been less effective. In Brazil 
and Chile, women enjoy a relatively high degree of substantive representation, albeit 
lower than in Argentina and Mexico, despite low descriptive representation. This paper 
 124 
found that these discrepancies can be explained, in large part, by the collaboration and 
consensus patterns and norms among female legislators and women’s civil society 
groups. This conclusion adds to the current understanding of the impact of gender quotas 
by identifying women and women’s organizations as critical actors. More importantly, it 
suggests that an increased focus on when, how, and why women mobilize is needed in 
order to fully understand the degrees of descriptive and substantive representation that 
arise from gender quotas.  
 This finding could be explored in future research to study the methods of 
mobilization that are most effective and the degree of institutionalization of women’s 
networks necessary to ensure lasting high descriptive and substantive representation. It is 
also worth considering whether this mobilization must occur on a grass-roots level, as in 
the case studies, or whether it could be engineered through forums and existing women’s 
organizations in other countries. This is an important consideration for public policy. It is 
clear that in countries where gender quota adoption or reform is being debated, women 
must be involved in the discussion and given the opportunity to organize collectively. 
The best format of that debate and organization, however, remains unclear. It is also 
important to recognize that this paper did not explore the dynamics of race, ethnicity, or 
class in gender quotas and their effects. However, these are, of course, significant issues 
that remain understudied in research on gender quotas. Future research should work to 
identify the most effective forms of mobilization to ensure that gender quotas promote 
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